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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the highly influential paper by Autor et al. (2003), task compositions of oc-
cupations and their effects on changes in the wage structure have become a field
of major interest within the economic literature. Task compositions of occupa-
tions have changed drastically over the last 30 years and substantially altered the
demand for skills and human capital. Therefore, Autor et al. (2003) introduced
the task-based view in the literature on labor markets.
Although most recently researchers such as Autor et al. (2003) and Spitz-
Oener (2006), rely on the task-based view to explain the increasing demand for
high educated workers and and the steadily rising income inequality, researchers
did not yet answer whether different types of tasks affect labor market outcomes
such as job choices, unemployment or even entire individual careers.
Until today most available data sets contain rather broad classification of indi-
vidual’s industries or occupations. Therefore, researchers face difficulties to pro-
vide empirical evidence for the influences of the task-based view on most labor
market outcomes. Yet even if jobs and occupations are in particular descriptions
for different bundles of tasks, the tasks themselves influence labor market out-
comes and the classification according to jobs and occupations is far to broad to
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describe many labor market phenomena. Therefore, we argue that the tasks-based
view is a fruitful concept to explain and account for many phenomena in the labor
market. As workers careers are the main incentive for human capital investments
and economic growth, investigating the task-based view in relation to a variety of
labor market outcomes is worthy research which enables us to provide novel and
far reaching policy implications.
To fill the gap in the existing literature, this dissertation investigates the rela-
tionship between occupational task compositions and different types of individual
labor market outcomes, which help to gain novel insights into labor market phe-
nomena that were not well explainable without the consideration of the tasks based
view.
The second chapter of this dissertation links the task-based view to the litera-
ture on human capital depreciation. In particular, we analyze the relationship be-
tween occupational task compositions and human capital depreciation. As former
empirical studies show that technological changes cause human capital deprecia-
tion, researchers are aware that not only the amount of human capital investments
but also the time of those investments matters to the individual. However, these
papers do not consider that workers performing different types of tasks suffer to
different extends from human capital depreciation.
Therefore, we introduce the task-based view in the literature on human capi-
tal depreciation by investigating human capital depreciation for individuals who
perform different kinds of tasks in their jobs. In particular, we distinguish be-
tween two broad task categories. First, we define the category of knowledge-
based tasks, as tasks that are closely related to certain technologies or the general
stock of knowledge available to society. One example for such tasks is writing
computer programs, as programming depends strongly on technological develop-
ment. Second, we define the category of experience-based tasks, as tasks that
2
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demand personal characteristics and can be improved by more experience but are
not closely attached to a certain kind of technology or the general stock of knowl-
edge. An example of such tasks is negotiating with customers or business part-
ners. Individuals surely might be able to improve their negotiating skills, but these
skills should not depend too much on ongoing technological changes. We show
in our empirical investigation that individuals with comparably high percentages
of knowledge-based tasks have higher rates of human capital depreciation than
individuals with comparably high percentages of experience-based tasks. The re-
sults indicate that ignoring the heterogeneity of individuals’ job contents in the
analysis of human capital depreciation might lead to misleading policy implica-
tions. In particular, technological changes do not only alter the demand for low-
and high-skilled workers but also affect the productivity of different types of skills
over a workers life cycle. Therefore, our main contribution to the literature is to
show that human capital depreciation is highly heterogeneous across workers per-
forming different tasks. Thus the task-based view helps us to understand why this
heterogeneity arises in the first place.
The third chapter of this dissertation continues to investigate the relation be-
tween tasks bundles and income. First, we link the task based view to the literature
on job displacement and investigate income losses of individuals that perform dif-
ferent types of tasks. Second, this chapter investigates displacement losses under
different forms of wage bargaining systems within one country. For this purpose,
we estimate income losses of Danish workers in different occupations that were
displaced at different points in time between 1980 and 2004—a period in which
Denmark underwent a substantial decentralization of it’s wage bargaining system.
We find that displacement losses increased substantially after the introduc-
tion of the flexible wage bargaining system. Moreover, we find that displacement
losses of commercial apprenticeship graduates depend substantially on the wage
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bargaining system but displacement losses of manufacturing workers do not. In
other words, commercial workers suffer rather small displacement losses under
a rigid wage bargaining system but their displacement losses increased substan-
tially after the introduction of the flexible wage bargaining system. In contrast
the pattern of the displacement losses of manufacturing workers remained rather
similar under both the flexible and the rigid wage bargaining system. One pos-
sible explanation for this difference is the nature of the workers human capital.
Particularly because manufacturing workers can be expected to have much more
specific human capital investments their displacement losses are mostly driven by
specific human capital losses and do not depend substantially on the nature of the
wage bargaining system.
Therefore, the contributions of this chapter are twofold. First, by showing a
relation between wage flexibility and displacement losses, we provide a new in-
sight of why displacement losses differ so substantially between Europe with it’s
mostly rigid wage formation process and the U.S. with it’s flexible wage bargain-
ing system. Second, by showing that the relation between displacement losses
and wage flexibility differs substantially for workers with different types of hu-
man capital, we show that displacement losses do dependt on the workers task
contents.
Human capital and income are not the only labor market outcomes that are
affected by job contents and different forms of tasks. Individuals choose their
jobs because they prefer or dislike certain kinds of tasks. Some individuals might
gain utility by performing tasks they like, whereas other individuals suffer because
they have to perform task they do not like. However, preferences are not randomly
distributed within the labor force. In particular, social stereotypes about individ-
ual characteristics such as gender or ethnicity are likely to determine individuals’
preferences for jobs and tasks.
4
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Building on this idea recent theoretical papers incorporate the sociological
concept of identity into classical utility frameworks. These papers investigate
how stereotypes affect worker’s utility and influence labor market outcomes such
as job choices and other career decisions (e.g. Akerlof and Kranton (2000)). The
theoretical literature argues that the individuals identity is determined by gender-
specific stereotypes leading utility maximizing individuals to choose jobs that are
socially acceptable rather than choosing the best paid jobs. Consequently, such
theories might help to understand the persistence of gender segregation in the
labor market. Nevertheless, because of the lack of empirical evidence on the re-
lationship between gender-specific stereotypes and utility it remains difficult to
access the validity of these theories.
Therefore, we link the task-based view to the literature on job satisfac-
tion by investigating the relation between individual utility—measured as job
satisfaction—and different task bundles that are linked to gender-specific stereo-
types. In particular, the third chapter investigates a sub-topic of the literature
on jobs satisfaction by investigating the relationship between stereotypical task
contents and gender-specific job satisfaction.
We use a special dataset allowing us to link the concept of gender stereotypes,
tasks and job satisfaction. The chapter shows that women are less satisfied with
their jobs—in particular with their work climate—if performing tasks associated
with male stereotypes. In contrast, men are less satisfied with their jobs if per-
forming tasks related to female stereotypes.
This dissertation contributes to the literature on job satisfaction by showing,
with a big representative data set, that gender-specific stereotypes influence job
satisfaction. Moreover, this dissertation provides the first large-scale evidence
on a theoretical paper that introduces the sociological concepts of identity and
social stereotypes in an economic framework (Akerlof and Kranton; 2000). Ad-
5
Chapter 1: Introduction
ditionally, we contribute to the literature on gender segregation by showing that
choosing socially acceptable jobs rather then the best paid jobs might be a utility
maximizing strategy for individuals.
In the final chapter, we draw conclusions by synthesizing the results from all
three studies and present policy implications.
6
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Skill obsolescence, vintage effects
and changing tasks
a related version of this work is published in: Applied Economics Quarterly 55(1)
(2009) pp. 83–103 (with Uschi Backes-Gellner)
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is our first contribution in investigating the relation between different
types of tasks and labor market outcomes. In particular, we investigate the value of
human capital for individuals performing different types of tasks and show how
the value of these tasks changes over an individual’s span of life. As the most
intuitive value of human capital are ernings, this chapter investigates experience
earnings profiles for individuals that perform different sets of tasks.
Human capital is no doubt one of the most important factors for future eco-
nomic growth and well-being, but human capital is also prone to become obsolete
over time. Skills that have been acquired at one point in time may perfectly match
the skill requirements at that time but may become obsolete as time goes by. The
7
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more innovative an economy is, the more likely it is that particular technological
or methodological skills will become obsolete.
Spitz-Oener (2006) showed that the composition of tasks demanded by dif-
ferent occupations has changed considerably over the last decades. Specifically,
Spitz-Oener (2006) showed that routine tasks manual tasks were replaced by non-
routine cognitive or analytical tasks. However, independently of whether tasks
are routine or non-routine different types of tasks might suffer in different ways of
human capital depreciation. In particular, we argue that two types of tasks must
be distinguished: knowledge-based tasks and experience-based tasks. We define
knowledge-based tasks as tasks depending strongly on the general stock of tech-
nological knowledge available to society, whereas experienced-based tasks are
defined as tasks demanding personal characteristics that can be improved by gain-
ing more and more experience. In contrast to Spitz-Oener (2006), both of our task
categories may contain routine and non-routine tasks. The major novelty of our
categorization is that the human capital of people performing knowledge-based
tasks strongly suffers from depreciation, whereas the human capital of individuals
performing experience-based tasks does not. This is mainly because the general
stock of technological knowledge available to a society at a given point in time is
changing and rising. Therefore, technologies and work processes are changing. If
certain human capital is strongly related to older technologies or work processes,
it becomes worthless with the disappearance of the technologies and processes.
As knowledge-based tasks by definition depend on the actual stock of techno-
logical knowledge we argue that individuals performing mainly knowledge-based
tasks in their jobs should suffer more from skill obsolescence than individuals
performing mainly experience-based tasks which are timeless and comparatively
independent from actual technologies. Therefore, we extend the study of Spitz-
Oener (2006) by investigating whether the human capital depreciates differently
8
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for workers performing different types of tasks with different skill requirements
over a period of more than twenty years.
We investigate this relationship by observing different influences of task com-
binations on individual incomes. In order to study such effects, we need a database
with detailed information on tasks that people perform at the workplace over a
long time span. Therefore, we use the four waves of the so-called BIBB/IAB
Qualification and Career Survey because it not only deeply specifies the tasks in-
dividuals perform in their jobs, but also covers a time span of more than twenty
years, which is a prerequisite to studying the above-mentioned vintage effects.
Making use of extended Mincer type earnings regressions (similar to an ap-
proach developed by Neuman and Weiss; 1995), we find the following: work-
ers performing different types of tasks are affected differently by skill obsoles-
cence. In more detail workers face greater skill obsolescence whenever the share
of knowledge-based tasks is high in comparison to the share of experience-based
tasks. These results provide novel insights in the way of looking on experience
earnings profiles and extend the literature on skill obsolescence since previous
literature distinguished only between differences in the obsoleteness of various
groups of workers (for example, with different educational backgrounds), but not
between differences in obsoleteness depending on the types of tasks a person per-
forms.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In chapter 2.2, we present
previous literature and our own theoretical considerations in more detail. In chap-
ter 2.3, we present our estimation strategy. In chapter 2.4, we describe the data.
Chapter 2.5 follows with the results, and chapter 2.6 concludes the article.
9
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2.2 Literature and theory
Rosen (1975) and Ben-Porath (1967) were among the first to study depreciation
or obsolescence due to technological progress. They point out that human capital
loses value because it is related to technologies that are no longer used. Work-
ers of recent vintages are beneficiaries of new technologies as they grew up with
recent knowledge about the technology and were adapted to it during school, fur-
ther education or training. Thus, younger workers can be more productive than
workers of older vintages if the older workers do not continue investing in recent
human capital. As soon as older technologies are no longer used, skills connected
to them become obsolete. As Rosen (1975) argues more comprehensively, some
(technological) knowledge may turn out to be incorrect or less general than it was
supposed to be in former times.
The empirical literature investigates skill obsolescence or depreciation using
different approaches (for an overview, see De Grip and Van Loo; 2002). Some
studies focus on subjective measures or certain labor market outcomes, such as
unemployment or the transition from education to work. Ludwig and Pfeiffer
(2005), for example, show, by using a subjective measure, that human capital
accumulated during vocational training is confronted with a steadily rising rate of
depreciation. However, apart from that, most studies focus on wages. While some
try to measure the rate of depreciation exactly, such as Arrazole and de Hevia
(2004) or Groot (1998), others focus more on the detection of vintage effects or
depreciation in general (Neuman and Weiss; 1995; Weiss; 1978).
Thus, the literature supports the theory that workers who entered the labor
market in earlier years and have acquired older skill vintages can be expected to
have less up-to-date knowledge than workers entering more recently and hold-
ing more recent skill vintages. On one hand the appearance of new technologies
makes skills become obsolete if they are attached to older technologies. On the
10
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other hand older workers invest less time in accumulating human capital, accu-
mulate less of the steadily growing stock of recent technological knowledge and,
therefore, cannot countervail the negative effects of human capital depreciation.
However, we argue that obsolescence due to external changes, such as tech-
nological progress will not affect every skill set equally. The rate of skill obsoles-
cence rather depends on the tasks a worker must perform or the objectives he is
confronted with in his working life. We argue that two types of tasks must be dis-
tinguished, which we will call knowledge-based tasks and experience-based tasks
throughout the rest of the paper.
We argue that knowledge-based tasks depend strongly on the actual stock of
technological knowledge in a society and therefore, we expect people performing
mainly these kinds of tasks to strongly suffer from depreciation and skill obsoles-
cence. Writing computer programs, for example, depends strongly on technologi-
cal developments in this field. Currently, for instance, many business applications
are written in .NET or Java. Younger workers who are trained in these programs
have productivity advantages in comparison to older workers who grew up with
Fortran or Pascal.
In contrast, we define experience-based tasks as tasks depending on personal
factors and abilities that grow with individual experience. Selling or negotiat-
ing are two examples for these kinds of tasks. These tasks demand a good sense
for human behavior or certain personal characteristics such as sympathy or self
esteem and depend less on technological knowledge. Thus, we expect them to
suffer less from depreciation due to technological change. Instead, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that more experienced workers (older vintages) have even an
advantage in performing these kinds of tasks.
So far we only considered the depreciation due to external factors such as the
technological development. But skills could also become obsolete due to internal
11
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factors; i.e. simply due to the aging of individuals and this aging affecting their
individual productivities. This kind of skill depreciation is called internal depreci-
ation and the psychological and medical literature can provide additional helpful
insights on this. It distinguishes between different kinds of intelligence. On the
one hand, the concept of fluid intelligence refers to abilities such as the fast pro-
cessing of information or the ability to understand abstract concepts. On the other
hand, the concept of crystalline intelligence refers to skills based on experience
and social competence, as well as the ability of ambivalence. They argue that
fluid intelligence depreciates due to biological aging from thirty years onwards.
Crystalline intelligence, however, does not suffer from depreciation due to aging
(Sternberg; 2005; Baltes et al.; 2005; Compton et al.; 2003) .
One can argue that the handling of technologies or technology related knowl-
edge requires abilities such as processing information or understanding abstract
concepts. Hence, fluid intelligence is probably more important to perform
knowledge-based tasks properly than experience based tasks. In contrast one
can argue that experience-based tasks demand abilities such as social compe-
tence and therefore particularly benefit from crystalline intelligence. Thus, the
evidence from psychological literature on aging supports our view that skill ob-
solescence is larger for workers performing mainly knowledge-based tasks than
for workers performing mainly experience-based tasks. Moreover, as crystalline
intelligence is important to perform experience-based tasks one can conclude that
older workers should even benefit from focusing on these kinds of tasks.
In sum, we can conclude that the skills needed to perform knowledge-based
tasks should suffer more from skill obsolescence then the skills needed to perform
experience-based tasks. In fact, one could expect that the latter improve with
experience. In the following, we try to measure this effect indirectly by applying
an idea from Neuman and Weiss (1995) to experience earnings profiles in cross
12
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sectional data.
13
Chapter 2: Skill obsolescence, vintage effects and changing tasks
2.3 Estimation strategy
In this section, we show what we can learn about human capital depreciation
from estimated experience earnings profiles. Therefore, we follow Neuman and
Weiss (1995) and Ramirez (2002) by applying an idea from Mincer (1974) to cross
sectional data. The main focus of our investigation will be the year of experience
at which earnings profiles peak. In detail, we look for the earnings peaks for
different groups of workers performing different kinds of tasks.
To clarify our approach we give a short overview of the classical Mincer model
with depreciation. Mincer (1974) stated that an individual’s earnings capacity E j
after j years in the labor force will be approximately
lnE j = E0 +
t=0
∑
j−1
rtkt (2.1)
E0 is the earnings capacity when the individual starts working, and rt is the
rate of return in on-the-job training; kt = CtEt is the ratio of investment in on-the-
job training (Ct) to gross earnings (Et), and it is assumed that kt ≤ 1 and decreases
over time. Equation (2.1) represents the so-called standard Mincer model. How-
ever, Mincer (1974) himself expanded this model by incorporating a rate of de-
preciation δt . Thus, equation (2.2) follows:
lnE j = E0 +
t=0
∑
j−1
(rtk∗t −δt) (2.2)
Whereby k∗t is now the ratio of gross investment with C∗t . In empirical data
we are able to observe net earnings rather than the earnings capacity. If Y j are the
net earnings at time t = j , one can show that:
lnYj = lnYj−1 + ln(1+ r j−1k∗j−1−δ j−1)+ ln(1− k∗j)− ln(1− k∗j−1) (2.3)
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Thus, earnings will peak when the right hand side of equation (2.3) equals the
left hand side. Hence, earnings peak if we have:
δ j−1 = (1+ r j−1)k∗j−1− k∗j (2.4)
As k∗j is assumed to be strictly linear and decreasing, equation (2.4) indicates
that earnings will peak earlier if the rate of depreciation is higher. The distance
between k∗j−1− k∗j is bigger at earlier stages of a worker’s career. Like Neuman
and Weiss (1995) and Ramirez (2002), we argue that the rate of depreciation is
not equal for everyone. In contrast to Neuman and Weiss (1995), we are not
interested in understanding how skill obsolescence works for the human capital of
different education groups. Instead, as previously mentioned, we argue that skill
obsolescence depends on the tasks a worker performs. Hence, we have where
kbt denotes the amount of knowledge-based tasks and ebt denotes the amount of
experience-based tasks in an individual’s job.
Thus, from our theory we expect the rate of depreciation to be higher for
people performing jobs demanding a higher amount of knowledge-based tasks
given the amount of experience-based tasks. Thus, ∂δ∂kbt > 0. Therefore, given the
amount of experience based tasks, the earnings functions should peak earlier the
higher the amount of knowledge-based tasks. As we expect the reverse to be true
for experience-based tasks, we have ∂δ∂ebt < 0 .
To prove our hypotheses, we apply the following extended Mincer type earn-
ings function:
lnyi = β0 +β1expi +β2exp2i +β3kbti j +β4kbti j ∗ expi +β5ebti j
+β6ebti j ∗ expi +Xiβ7 + εi
(2.5)
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lnyi stands for the logarithm of the observed net earnings of individual i; expi
and its squared term are the years of labor market experience; β1 and β2 are the re-
spective coefficients. Xi is a matrix containing further controls, such as schooling,
professional status, gender and firm size. β7 is the respective coefficient vector. εi
is assumed to be a normal distributed error term with mean zero. As we are inter-
ested in measuring the effects of certain task compositions on experience earnings
profiles, we extended the classical Mincer model by kbti j, a variable measuring the
average share of all knowledge-based tasks observable in the data for individual
i’s job j, and by ebti j , the average share of all experience-based tasks observable
in the data for individual i’s job j. Moreover, we interacted the variables kbti j and
ebti j with the experience variable expi. β3 to β6 are the respective coefficients.
Thus, as we expect the earnings profile to peak earlier for an increasing amount of
knowledge-based tasks (given the amount of experience-based tasks) the coeffi-
cient β4 should be negative. In the same way, the coefficient β6 should be positive
as we expect the earnings profiles to peak later if the amount of experienced-based
tasks is large.
In the language of Mincer (1974), equation (2.6) gives the experience value
at which earnings peak (i.e., the derivative of (2.5) with respect to expi solved
for expi). The left hand side of (2.6) will decrease as kbt rises if β4 is negative
and increase if ebt rises and β6 is positive (note that in Mincer regressions β1 is
expected to be positive and β2 is expected to be negative).
expi = f (β1,β2,β3,β4) =
−(β1 +β4kbt +β6ebt)
2β2
(2.6)
However, one could also give two more intuitive interpretations for the ex-
pected regression results.
First, if β4 in (2.5) is negative, it indicates that the marginal rate of return
for experience decreases faster if the share of knowledge-based tasks is higher,
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whereas a positive β6 indicates that the marginal rate of return for experience
decreases slower if the share of experience-based tasks is higher. Thus, under
the assumption of equal investments in human capital, the value of one year of
human capital investments decreases faster for people performing a high share of
knowledge-based tasks then for people performing a comparative high share of
experienced-based tasks. This indicates a higher rate of depreciation for people
performing mainly knowledge-based tasks in their jobs.
Second, one could give an alternative interpretation of the maximum of ex-
perience earnings profiles in cross sections. The second interpretation considers
the fact that it is not possible to follow individuals over time if we look on cross-
sectional evidence. Specifically, as we observe individuals with different amounts
of work experience at one point in time, an early peak indicates that many in-
dividuals with relatively short working careers earn more than individuals with
longer careers. Thus, one could argue, as individuals with shorter careers usually
have more recent human capital then individuals with longer careers, that there
is a taste for fresh human capital in the labor market. In other words, individuals
with longer careers and a high amount of human capital suffer due to skill obso-
lescence and earn less than their younger colleagues. This interpretation is more
in line with a recent model by Laing et al. (2003).
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2.4 Data
For our empirical investigation, we used data from the Qualification and Career
Survey. This survey is carried out by the German Federal Institute for Voca-
tional Training (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung) and the research Institute of the
Federal Employment Service (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung).
It sampled a representative group of the German workforce in 1979, 1985/86,
1991/92 and 1998/99. Each sample contains around 30,000 observations.
We only cover people between the ages of 18 and 65 having no more than 45
years of experience. We excluded individuals from East Germany (because they
are not observable in every wave), foreigners, the unemployed, self-employed
workers and individuals working less than 35 hours per week. In addition, we
excluded workers with implausible high or low wages by dropping one percent of
people with the highest and one percent of people with the lowest wages. These
constraints result in 15,278 observations in 1979, 15,330 observations in 1985/86,
13,808 observations in 1991/92, and 11,871 observations in 1998/99.
The underlying data set refers to tasks that people have to perform to properly
do their jobs. Hence, people had to choose these tasks from a given list. As
mentioned in the second section, we distinguished between two types of tasks.
The first category refers to knowledge-based tasks and the second to experience-
based tasks. These categories were constructed as presented in Appendix A.2 to
A.5 for each wave.
Thus, knowledge-based tasks are all tasks for which it can be assumed that
they depend strongly on a given type of technical knowledge at a certain point
in time. As an example one can take "repairing machines, equipment, etc.". It
is obvious that a person has to have knowledge of the machine’s technology. If
this technology changes, the worker’s abilities will no longer fit with the skill re-
quirements to repair these machines. Thus whenever technology is involved that
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is not timeless, we expect to find strong skill obsolescence effects. However, this
category does not only include technology in the sense of machinery, or hard- and
software, but also for example legal or institutional regulations which also might
strongly change over time. An example that one could think of are changing col-
lective agreements, labor law or environmental law: the rules that have to be met
at one point in time may be different from the rules that have to be met at another
point in time. Thus, the particular knowledge from one time period may be com-
pletely obsolete in a later period. Moreover, these tasks demand analytical skills
and therefore fluid intelligence which we also relate to knowledge-based tasks. A
complete overview of knowledge-based tasks in comparison to experience-based
tasks is given in table A.2 to A.5 in the appendix. We expect all tasks on the
right side of the tables in A.2 to A.5 to be affected quite strongly over time by
external changes in the stock of technological knowledge. In contrast, we argue
that all tasks on the left side of the tables in A.2 to A.5 are not affected by ex-
ternal changes in the stock of technological knowledge. Instead, the tasks on the
left side depend more on personal factors which may even increase over time due
to increased experiences. Thus, we do not expect strong depreciation effects for
these types of tasks.
Compared to Spitz-Oener (2006) who also suggested a separation of different
tasks based on the same variables of the BIBB/IAB data set, our categories are
different in two ways. First, we use a more complete set of tasks in the single
waves then she did. Since we were not interested in observing changes in task
combinations from wave to wave, we were not faced with the same restrictions
like Spitz-Oener (2006). Because our analysis uses each of the single waves sep-
arately we were not forced to use only comparable tasks in each of the waves.
Thus, we decided to incorporate more tasks in our categories even if they were
not observable in every wave. Second, our definition criterion reference is quite
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different because we were interested in the distinction between task depending
on technological knowledge and tasks depending on personal factors and commu-
nication skills. For example, in her paper tasks such as equipping machines are
considered to be routine manual tasks. In our paper we argue they are knowledge-
based tasks because workers performing these tasks have to deal with potentially
changing technologies. The question whether a task at a given point in time is
routine or non-routine is not important to us; for our analysis it is only important
whether for a given task at a given time the job requirements are expected to be
the same as for a task at a future point in time.
In addition, to consider the fact that task sets differ quite widely between the
single cross sections, we will calculate two versions of the measure to check the
robustness of our results.
First, we created a measure in a similar fashion to Spitz-Oener (2006) (with
different categorization). Thus, we divided the number of activities that an indi-
vidual performs in each category (knowledge based tasks/experience based tasks)
by the total number of observable tasks in that category. Afterwards, we calcu-
lated the average of this task measure for each of the 83 job categories listed in
Appendix A.6. This was done for every wave separately as task sets observable
in each wave differ strongly. Thus, every job has four different task measures for
both categories (one for each wave).
A second measure was created by pooling the sample of all four waves and
calculating an overall average of the first measure for each occupation and task
category, which is constant over all waves. Hence, there is just one pooled value
that differs for each job and category but is the same in each wave.
To give an example of the first measure, we observe that mechanics performed
on average around 6 percent of knowledge based tasks and 2 percent of experience
based tasks in 1979. For 1985/86 we have 24 percent and 6 percent, for 1991/92
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we have 25 and 6 and for 1998/99 we have 52 and 37 percent. Note that the values
differ quite widely and are not comparable over time as the questionnaires were
different in every wave. However, for the second measure, mechanics perform on
average 24 percent of all observable knowledge based tasks and around 9 percent
of all observable experience based tasks.
The first approach has the advantage that we can test whether our expectations
hold independent of the fact that the tasks we are able to observe in every wave
differ quite strongly. Nevertheless, it has the drawback that we may measure
different effects in every wave. The second approach ensures that we measure
a similar effect in every wave by considering the average of all observable tasks
weighted by the individuals performing the respective jobs in every wave. The
drawback of the second approach is that we have to assume that the average task
combinations did not change within jobs over time. The measures will be used as
indicators for and of equations (2.5) and (2.6).
For yi we use monthly wages. The experience measure expi was directly ob-
tained from the survey. Moreover, we added certain controls in Xi. We used a
set of dummies corresponding to the degrees in the German education system as
variables for the level of general education. Thus, we created a dummy taking the
value of one whenever an individual holds neither an apprenticeship degree nor a
university degree (low education). A second dummy is one if the individual holds
an apprenticeship degree (medium education), and a third is one for university
graduates (high education). Moreover, we used a dummy for gender, taking the
value of 1 if the person is female and 0 otherwise. Further controls were added
for the professional status of the worker, including dummies for unskilled, blue
collar workers (skilled), foremen, white collar workers and civil servants. Firm
size dummies were also included in the regressions. Descriptive statistics on all
explanatory variables can be found in Appendix A.1.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics
In Table 2.1, we present some detailed descriptive statistics of our task measures
for the pooled sample. In the descriptive statistics, we will only refer to the pooled
sample as the statistics give qualitatively the same results if we look on each wave
separately.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics for index of knowledge and experience based
tasks
Average percentage of all performed knowledge-based tasks (kbt) by category
Professional Status:
Unskilled Blue Collar White Collar Civil Servant
10.26 18.92 23.43 16.60
Education:
Low education Medium Education High Education
9.31 16.94 25.63
Gender:
Female Male
10.96 19.1
Average percentage of all performed experience-based tasks (kbt) by category
Professional Status:
Unskilled Blue Collar White Collar Civil Servant
3.87 7.02 19.94 25.59
Education:
Low education Medium Education High Education
6.624 16.92 33.99
Gender:
Female Male
18.984 16.05
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1979-1998/99.
In the first and second column we examine how the tasks are distributed across
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different levels of professional status. Thus, the first row in the third column
tells us, for example, that unskilled workers perform around 10 percent of all
observable knowledge-based tasks and only around 4 percent of all experience-
based tasks. In every other professional category we have higher average values.
For blue collar workers, we observe a strong focus on knowledge-based tasks, i.e.
around 19 percent of knowledge-based tasks and only 7 percent of experience-
based tasks. In contrast the difference between knowledge and experience-based
tasks is rather small for white collar workers. This makes sense if one considers
that blue collar workers probably participate directly in the production process
and have less contact with clients. White collar workers, in contrast, can either
perform technical jobs, like engineers or computer technicians, or highly client-
related jobs in the service sector. The same reason could explain why civil servants
perform a rather large share of experience-based tasks as these jobs are mostly less
related to technology.
In the fifth and sixth columns we show the tasks distributions according to
educational level. The results tell us that a larger amount of human capital in
the form of educational level leads people to perform a larger set of different
tasks. This holds for either knowledge or experience-based tasks as the shares
are (at around 25 and 34 percent) highest for individuals with a university degree.
Individuals holding neither an apprenticeship degree nor a university degree, in
contrast, have the lowest values for both task categories.
The last two columns of Table 2.1 present the results of the task distribution
according to worker gender. The first row tells us that females perform a big-
ger share of experience-based tasks, whereas the second row shows that males
perform on average more knowledge-based tasks. This result is in line with the
fact that in Germany, more men study technical subjects or hold jobs involving
technical content.
23
Chapter 2: Skill obsolescence, vintage effects and changing tasks
2.5.2 Regression results for the first specification
To show how the composition of tasks affects workers’ wages, we present the
estimation of equation (2.5) according to our first measure in Table 2.2. Hence,
in Table 2.2 we stayed with the task measure, which differs in every wave. We
estimated eight specifications; two for each wave.
Thus, we have one specification where we regressed the logarithmic monthly
wage on our main variables of interest without further controls (i.e., equation (2.5)
without ) and one specification with the full set of variables.
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The coefficients of experience and experience squared show the typical signs
and power. However, let us take a look at the main variables of interest. If we first
consider the variables on the share of all possible knowledge-based tasks (kbt) and
the share of all possible experience-based tasks (ebt), we find significant positive
values throughout all specifications apart from specification II, where the variable
of ebt is significant and negative. However, apart from specification II, the results
indicate that whenever the share of tasks demanded by a certain job rises, the
person earns a significantly higher wage and it is irrelevant whether the tasks are
knowledge-based or experience-based. This outcome is reasonable from a human
capital perspective. A higher demand of various tasks in a job should lead to a
higher ability and therefore higher individual productivity.
More interestingly, the share of all possible knowledge-based tasks always
gives us a bigger coefficient then the share of experience-based tasks. Thus, at
the beginning of a career (with 0 years of experience), a one percent increase in
the share of knowledge-based tasks always leads to a higher wage advantage than
a one percent increase in the share of experience-based tasks. Now, considering
the interaction term Ebt×Exp for knowledge-based tasks, we have either signif-
icant negative coefficients for specifications III and V to VIII or coefficients that
do not differ from zero. This indicates that a given share of knowledge-based
tasks will either not give individuals an extra wage advantage if they progress in
their careers or can even harm them with respect to workers holding jobs with
a lower share of knowledge-based tasks. With respect to the theory of Mincer
(1974), specifications III and V to VIII confirm our theory that the rate of human
capital depreciation is higher when the share of knowledge-based tasks is higher.
The coefficients are significant and negative and therefore indicate an earlier peak
holding everything else constant. Thus, the marginal rate of return for experience
decreases at a faster rate if the share of knowledge-based tasks is high in a job.
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However, in specifications I, II and IV, our theory is not confirmed by significant
negative values.
Let us take a look at the interaction terms for Kbt×Exp for experience based
tasks. All columns show significant positive effects. Hence, even if the wage
advantage is somewhat higher for workers performing jobs with a high demand
of knowledge-based tasks at the beginning of the career, performing jobs with
a high demand of experience-based tasks seems to benefit mainly workers with
longer careers. Thus, the earnings profiles peak later if the share of experience-
based tasks is higher in a given job, assuming everything else to be constant. The
marginal rate of return decreases slower for individuals performing higher shares
of experience-based tasks in their jobs.
2.5.3 Regression results for the second specification
In Table 2.3 we present the results for our second specification measure of tasks.
Here we present X specifications as we added two specifications of the pooled
sample; one with controls and one without controls. Now, as explained above, we
have the same measures for the task portfolios in every wave, and hence, results
are more comparable. As in Table 2.2, the results in Table 2.3 support our theory.
We also observe that the coefficients of Kbt and Ebt are positive and significant
and the coefficient of kbt is always higher. Moreover, we observe a significant
negative coefficient for Kbt ×Exp and a positive one for Ebt ×Exp. Thus, as
predicted by our theory, experience earnings profiles peak earlier if the share of
knowledge-based tasks demanded by a job is higher given the share of experience-
based tasks and vice versa. Moreover, the magnitudes of the coefficients seem
to be quite stable and cannot be controlled away by the incorporation of further
control variables. This indicates that we indeed measure a similar effect in every
wave.
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Chapter 2: Skill obsolescence, vintage effects and changing tasks
To illustrate the results of table 2.3 we plot the earnings profiles according to
the estimation results in table 2.3 for three hypothetical task sets. The first task
set puts a high weight on knowledge-based tasks and a low weight on experience-
based tasks. The second task set puts a high weight on experience-based tasks and
a low weight on knowledge based tasks and the third task set puts equal weights
on both knowledge and experience-based tasks.
Figure 2.1: Experience earnings profiles by task set
Note: Task set 1: 75 percentile of kbt=22.863 and 25 percentile of ebt=7.896; Task set 2: 50
percentile of kbt=11.251 and ebt=25.414; Task set 3: 25 percentile of kbt=14.112 and 75 percentile
of ebt=14.791
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All plotted graphs stem from the extended regressions with further controls.
The y-axis refers to the log monthly wages and the x-axis represents the amount
of experience. We plotted the graphics for every year separately. We excluded the
graphic for the pooled sample but the results are qualitative the same.
The graphics reveal that the rate of depreciation is higher for individuals per-
forming a high share of knowledge-based tasks as the profiles of task set 1 peak
the earliest in every cross section. For example, in 1979 the wage profile of the
first task set peaks at around 24 years of experience whereas the wage profile of
task set 2 peaks at around 28 years of experience. Hence, for task set 1 we can say
that people with 24 years of experience earn more than for example individuals
with 40 years of experience. In contrast we find the maximum of the wage profile
for task set 2 four years later with 28 years of work experience. Thus, especially
if workers focus on knowledge-based tasks they suffer from depreciation and earn
less with respect to their younger colleagues.
Moreover, the graphics illustrate that younger workers (i.e. workers of recent
vintages) even benefit over workers with other task combinations if they perform
mainly knowledge-based tasks in their jobs. Thus, for the first years of experience
the wage profiles of the first task sets exceed the profiles of the other task sets.
However, later in the career the wage paths are exceeded by the wage profiles of
task set 2 and task set 3. Especially, the profile of the latter set (i.e. set which
has the focus on experience-based tasks) shows high wages at the end of careers.
Thus, workers of older vintages benefit if they focus on experience-based tasks.
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A.1 Tables
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the investigation
Variable Std. Dev. Mean Max Min
Tasks:
Knowledge based tasks (kbt) 7.701 16.604 37.821 3.643
Experiecne based tasks (ebt) 10.427 16.979 54.375 0
Ln(monthly wages) 0.448 7.936 9.159 6.551
Experience 11.921 18.24 45 0
Sex 0.462 0.309 1 0
Education:
Low education 0.364 0.157 1 0
Medium education 0.436 0.744 1 0
High education 0.297 0.098 1 0
Frim size:
Less then 5 employees 0.242 0.063 1 0
5-9 employees 0.319 0.115 1 0
10-49 employees 0.435 0.253 1 0
50-99 employees 0.324 0.119 1 0
100-499 employees 0.412 0.216 1 0
500-999 employees 0.256 0.071 1 0
More then 1000 employees 0.369 0.163 1 0
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1979-1998/99.
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Table A.2: Task categories for the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung from 1979
Experience based tasks Knowledge based tasks
Advertising, PR-Work, Publicizing Researching, analyzing, exploring
Buying, selling properties Projecting, planning, making plans
Parenting, training, teaching; Consult-
ing or counseling
Applying and using the law or rights
Negotiating, representing someoneŠs
interests
Programming
Publishing, journalistically or literar-
ily working
Repairing machines, equipment, vehi-
cles and constructions
Organizing, planning, managing Making constructions, sketching,
modeling
Calling for customers, visiting firms
or companies
Chemically-physically analyzing and
examining
Renting, brokering objects Medically-biologically analyzing and
cytologically examining
Auctioning objects Shorthanding, ciphering, coding
Serving, accommodating Reporting, drawing up the balance
sheet
Negotiating with customers or suppli-
ers, advising customers
Making or interpreting statistics
Evaluating data processing
Working out laws or regulations
Examining, appraising, estimating
Using, equipping, and maintaining
a computer, software, terminals and
monitors
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1979.
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Table A.3: Task categories for the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung from 1985/86
Experience based tasks Knowledge based tasks
Buying, advising, advertising Researching, analyzing, measuring,
examining
Parenting/teaching, training, consult-
ing
Making constructions, sketching, de-
signing
Publishing, entertaining, presenting Applying and using the law or rights,
registering
Managing, employing personnel Programming
Organizing, planning, managing,
leading
Equipping machines
Entertaining Operating machines
Serving, accommodating Maintaining machines
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1985/86.
Table A.4: Task categories for the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung from 1991/92
Experience based tasks Knowledge based tasks
Buying, selling and advertising Researching, analyzing, measuring,
examining
Teaching, parenting and training Making constructions, sketching, de-
signing
Publishing, entertaining, presenting
and designing
Applying and using the law or rights,
registering
Coordinating, organizing and plan-
ning
Programming
Managing, employing personnel Equipping machines
Serving Operating machines
Maintaining machines
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
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Table A.5: Task categories for the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung from 1998/99
Experience based tasks Knowledge based tasks
Training and teaching Collecting and processing information
Consulting and providing information Developing and researching
Buying, selling Repairing
Organizing Guarding and maintaining machines
Negotiating
Marketing
Serving, accommodating
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1998/99.
Table A.6: Job categories
Job categories
Culturist Carpenter, roofer, scaffolder
Animal breeder, fishery professions Road and civil engineer
Administrator, adviser in agriculture Builder’s laborer
Agricultural workers, animal Building decorator
Horticulturist Interior decorator, upholsterer
Forest and hunting professions Cabinetmaker, model maker
Miners Painter, varnisher and related occupations
Mineral, petroleum and petroleum gas
production
Goods examiner, transport dressing
Mineral processing Unskilled worker
Brick machining Machinist and related occupations
Construction material manufacturer Engineer
Ceramist Chemist, physicist, mathematician
Gaffer Technician
Chemical worker Technical specialist
Synthetical fabricator Goods merchants
Paper manufacturer, paper fabricator Bank and insurance employee
Continued on next page...
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... table A.6 continued
Job categories
Pressman Other service occupations and related oc-
cupations
Wood preparation, wood fabrication Occupations for ground transport
Metal manufacturer, roller Occupations for sea and air transport
Former, caster Occupations for communication
Metal forming (non-machining) Chief storekeeper, storekeeper, transport
worker
Metal forming (machining) Entrepreneur, promoter, auditor
Metal surface machining, quenching and
tempering
Delegate, important administrative occu-
pations
Metal binder Accounting clerk, data processing spe-
cialist
Forger Office clerks, office hand
Fitter Security services
Locksmith Jailer
Machanician Registrar
Toolmaker Publicist, interpreter, librarian
Metalworker and related occupations Artist and related occupations
Electrician Doctor, pharmacist
Assembling and metal occupations Remaining occupations of health care
Spinning occupations Social worker and related occupations
Textile manufacturer Teacher
Textile fabricator Humanities and social science occupa-
tions
Textile refiner Pastor
Leather manufacturer, leather and fur fab-
ricator
Personal hygiene
Backery, confectioner Guest attendant
Meat and fish fabricator Housekeeping occupations
Continued on next page...
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... table A.6 continued
Job categories
Food preparation Cleaner
Beverage and stimulants manufacturer Remaining nutrition occupations
Bricklayer, concrete worker
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1979-1998/99.
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Chapter 3
Wage flexibility and displacement
losses.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates how workers that perform different sets of tasks—i.e.
workers in different occupations—suffer from income losses due to unemploy-
ment or wage reductions under different forms of wage bargaining systems. With
such an investigation we contribute to the recent literature that payed a great deal
of attention to the consequences of worker displacement for individual labor mar-
ket outcomes.
Using data from the U.S., numerous studies investigate income losses of dis-
placed workers and find that displacement is associated with severe and long last-
ing earnings losses on the order of 10-25 per cent. More recently, studies provide
estimates of displacement losses for other parts of the world and in particular for
Europe. These studies find much smaller displacement losses on the order of 6-10
per cent. Moreover, the wage losses in Europe are mostly related to reductions
in working hours and periods of non-employment. In fact, employment effects in
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Europe appear to be larger, with a significant impact on the probability of leaving
the labour force permanently.
Some researchers argue that those differences in estimated displacement losses
are a reflection of the genuine differences in the labor markets between the U.S.
and Europe (e.g. Hijzen et al.; 2010). One major potential source that causes dis-
placement losses to be bigger in the U.S. than in Europe might be differences in
the wage formation process of both continents. In particular, the centralization of
the wage bargaining system differs substantially between the US and Europe. The
U.S. has low union coverage rates and free bargaining systems, whereas in Europe
many countries have high union coverage rates and centralized wage bargaining
systems. Therefore, employers in the U.S. can easily adjust their wages accord-
ing to the economic situation whereas European employers cannot. As a result,
European employees might not suffer wage losses, as long as they are able to find
a subsequent job directly after displacement. However, attributing differences
in displacement losses exclusively to differences in the wage formation process
would be myopic, as European labor markets differ in many more ways from U.S.
labor markets. Moreover, former studies use data sources that are hardly compa-
rable across countries and estimated differences in displacement losses may arise
because researchers rely on very different methods and data sources (Couch and
Placzek; 2010).
Therefore, this paper contributes to the literature in two different ways. First,
this paper investigates displacement losses under different forms of wage bargain-
ing systems within one country. Second, we investigate displacement losses for
individuals that work in different occupations and perform different kinds of tasks.
For our purpose, we estimate income losses for Danish workers that were
displaced at different points in time between 1980 and 2004—a period in which
Denmark underwent a substantial decentralization of it’s wage bargaining system.
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Such an approach has the advantage that we can rely on a common data source
and can apply the same methods under different wage bargaining systems and
comparable economic conditions such that other country specific influences stay
rather stable.
In particular, this paper estimates displacement losses for young apprentice-
ship graduates departing from firms that went out of business between 1980 and
2004. We argue that such an investigation is ideal to draw further conclusion about
the relation between the centralization of the wage formation process and the size
of displacement losses. First, the Danish wage bargaining system was strongly
decentralized between 1980 and 2004. Until 1987 wages were set on the sectorial
level, whereas since 1993 most wages are bargained at the firm level. Second, the
Danish labor market is very flexible because employment protection and firing
costs are very low. Therefore, the labor market is comparable to labor markets
within bigger economies such as the U.S. or Britain which improves the external
validity of our results. Third, we estimate displacement losses for young appren-
ticeship graduates because the Danish apprenticeship system ensures that those
workers are able to perform a well-defined set of up-to-date tasks required for a
particular job or occupation. Therefore, we have reliable categorization of the
individuals occupation and do not have to rely on broader and unreliable catego-
rizations according to an individuals industry such as other studies do. Moreover,
we are able to investigate a very homogenous groups of workers having labor
market relevant skills and a minimum requirement of ability at different points in
time. Displacement losses for such a homogenous group of workers are less likely
to mirror pure ability differences between displaced and non-displaced workers.
Fourth, we focus on young workers who have recently graduated from their train-
ing program and do not differ too much in their firm specific investments. Thus
displacement losses are less likely to display differences in firm characteristics
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between displaced and non-displaced workers. Fifth, the Danish statistical office
provides access to unusually big and high quality administrative data sets for the
whole population over a period of more than 20 years allowing us to investigate
displacement losses very precisely.
Our findings reveal that displacement losses increased substantially after the
wage formation process has been decentralized in Denmark—particularly within
the first two years after displacement. Under a more flexible wage bargaining sys-
tem displacement losses are bigger either in boom periods or in recessions than
under an inflexible wage bargaining system in comparable economic situations.
In particular, we find the following: First, displacement losses within the first 4
years after displacement increased substantially between 1980 and 2004 and in
particular after 1987— the year after which wage bargaining was more and more
decentralized. Second, in the 1980s we find that most displacement losses are at-
tributed to spells of non-employment, whereas displacement losses in later periods
remain substantially even after controlling for spells of non-employment. Fourth,
from the beginning of the 1990s displaced workers are much more likely to end up
in the lower parts of their firms wage distribution than during the 1980s. However,
we fail to find substantial differences in displacement losses for individuals that
are trained for different types of occupations. One possible explanation for such
a result lies in the nature of the Danish apprenticeship system which assures that
workers are able to perform labor market relevant tasks that are easy to transfer
across firms. Moreover, we look particularly on young worker that do not differ
substantially in their amount of specific human capital.
Yet our results provide a plausible explanation of why displacement losses
differ so much between the U.S. and European countries. Thus even if data sets,
methods and varying economic periods might induce differences in the estimation
of displacement losses, our results suggest that the flexibility in the wage forma-
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tion process influences displacement losses substantially.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In chapter 4.2 we
present previous empirical literature on displacement losses from the U.S. and Eu-
rope and discuss the differences among those studies with regard to the flexibility
of the wage bargaining system. In chapter 4.3 we describe the wage bargaining
and apprenticeship system in Denmark to introduce the institutional background
for our investigation. Chapter 4.4 describes our estimation methods and chapter
4.5 the data and identification. Chapter 4.6 presents the results and chapter 4.7
concludes.
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3.2 Empirical literature
This section describes and compares prior U.S. and European studies on displace-
ment losses and explains the background of these studies in greater detail.
We begin with US—with it’s flexible wage bargaining system—where re-
searchers estimate usually big and long lasting displacement losses. We can dis-
tinguish two broad categories of empirical works on displacement losses. Studies
of the first category use mostly survey based data. Farber (1993) and Farber (1997)
use the Displaced Worker Survey and find displacement losses of around 9 to 12
per cent. Stevens (1997) and Ruhm (1991) use the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics and find losses of around 14 to 30 per cent. Couch (1998) and Chan and
Stevans (2004) find up to 50 per cent of income losses by using the Health and
Retirement Survey.
The other category of studies uses large scale register based employer-
employee data sets that are similar to the data we use. The most famous example
among those studies is Jacobsen et al. (1993). Using data from Pennsylvania,
Jacobsen et al. (1993) find displacement losses up to 40 per cent for long tenured
workers who did not suffer from periods of unemployment during the entire ob-
servation period. Schoeni and Dardia (1997) find displacement losses of about 25
per cent. By showing genuine wages losses for the employed Schoeni and Dardia
(1997) confirm the results of Jacobsen et al. (1993). However, Schoeni and Dardia
(1997) show that most of the initial wage loss estimated for the whole population
(not only the employed) stem from some form of unemployment spells. More
recent studies, such as Hildreth et al. (2005), who use data from California find
somewhat lower losses in the range of 12 to 16 per cent and Couch and Placzek
(2010)—using data from Connecticut—find income losses up to 33 percent .
In contrast to the U.S. evidence, most European studies find displacement
losses to be rather small or even non-existing. Couch (2001) uses data from
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the German Socio Economic Panel—a household-level longitudinal survey—and
finds an earnings loss of about 13.5 per cent in the first year after displacement
that declines towards 6 per cent in the second year after displacement. Burda and
Mertens (2001) estimate displacement losses for the same German Socio Eco-
nomic Panel in combination with a German register data panel (IAB) and confirm
that income losses after displacement are very low. They even find income gains
for lower percentiles of the income distribution. Bender et al. (1999), using the
same IAB data source in comparison with a large register data set from France,
find very small displacement losses for both countries. von Wachter and Bender
(2006) use a German linked employer-employee data set and focus on young ap-
prenticeship graduates for whom they find displacement losses of about 15 per
cent that fade to zero within 5 years after displacement. Bender et al. (1999) ar-
gue that displacement losses in Germany and France are rather small and short
lasting as both countries have strongly regulated labor markets in which wages
are bargained between employers and labor unions for industrial sectors. Austria
has a bargaining system similar to the German system and Ichino et al. (2007) find
displacement losses for Austrian workers of about 5 per cent.
Eliason and Storrie (2006) estimate displacement losses for displaced workers
using Swedish register data. Their sample consists of workers that were displaced
in 1987 and the researchers follow those workers until 1999. They find displace-
ment losses of about 6 per cent. In 1987 the Swedish wage bargaining system was
highly centralized but like in Denmark the wage bargaining system was decentral-
ized substantially after 1987.1
Using British data for the years between 1994-2003, Hijzen et al. (2010) find
displacement losses up to 35 per cent. In Britain the wage bargaining system
was strongly decentralized during the period between 1994 and 2003. Even if dis-
1For a detailed description of the bargaining system in Sweden, Denmark and Austria compare
Iversen (1996).
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placement losses are quite big compared to other European countries most of these
losses are due to spells of unemployment such as in other European countries.
The previous evidence on displacement losses shows a variety of results that
differ substantially depending on the data sets and methods. However, there is
a tendency that displacement losses are bigger in the US than in most European
countries. Even among European countries the evidence is not consistent. Previ-
ous estimates show, for example, that displacement losses are quite high in Britain
but rather low in Germany. Yet the former evidence indicates a tendency that dis-
placement losses are smaller in countries with rigid wage bargaining systems and
bigger under more flexible wage bargaining systems. However, the applied meth-
ods and data sets are too different across countries such that it is difficult to draw
a final conclusion. The next sub-section presents the institutional framework in
Denmark and explains how we make use of this particular setting to investigate
how displacement losses evolve under different forms of wage bargaining sys-
tems.
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3.3 Institutional background
The Danish labor market is characterized by considerable job mobility and an ex-
tensive social safety net for the unemployed. Between 25 and 35 per cent of the
workforce changes employers each year. These job changes involve periods of
unemployment because between a third and a quarter of the labor force is affected
by shorter unemployment spells in any given year. Firing costs are limited com-
pared to those in other European countries. Thus the low level of employment
protection is more similar to that found in Britain or the US (Albæk and Sørensen
(1998)). As the objective of this paper is to investigate displacement losses under
different types of wage bargaining systems, we describe the nature and changes
in the Danish bargaining system in the first subsection of this chapter. The second
subsection describes the Danish apprenticeship system and argues why Danish
apprentices are the ideal group of individuals to study displacement losses at dif-
ferent points in time.
3.3.1 The Danish wage bargaining system
The Danish labor market between 1980 and 2004 provides us with the ideal setting
to investigate how the flexibility in the wage formation process affects long term
displacement losses.
In general, the Danish labor market is well organized with more than 70 per-
cent of the work force organized in trade unions. However, although the Danish
wage bargaining system has traditionally been fairly centralized, the 1990s are
characterized by a shift to a more and more decentralized wage bargaining sys-
tem. In the beginning of the 1980’s wages were set in biannual national wage
negotiations. General wage negotiations took place between the Danish Federa-
tion of Trade Unions and the Danish Employer Federation. Although only about
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40 per cent of the private sector labor force was employed in firms where both the
employees and the employer were organized, the great majority of employers and
most workplaces applied the results of the general agreement.
From the beginning of the 1980s, there has been a tendency to a more decen-
tralized of wage bargaining system. A first step was the abolishment of the wage
indexation in 1982. From 1987 to 1993 negotiations concerning wages were done
at the industry level. Although wage bargaining was still restricted and coordi-
nated within strict guidelines, already in 1993 71 per cent of all agreements in
the manual labor market were negotiated at the firm level. The guidelines were
finally abandoned in 1993 (Aagaard et al.; 2004). As shown by Iversen (1996),
Denmark underwent a sharp drop in wage centralization during 1987 and 1993.
The change from a centralized to decentralized wage bargaining system was faster
and stronger in Denmark than in most other nordic countries.
3.3.2 The Danish apprenticeship system
We estimate displacement losses of young Danish apprenticeship graduates be-
cause the Danish apprenticeship systems ensures that those individuals are partic-
ularly homogeneous with respect to their labor market relevant skills and abilities.
Focusing on such a homogeneous group has the advantage that we do not estimate
displacement losses that are mostly attributed to ability differences or differences
in firm characteristics between displaced and non-displaced workers. Moreover,
as the apprenticeship system is steadily reformed to meet the requirements of the
labor market, we minimize the likelihood that displacement losses mirror macro
economic shocks affecting particular sub-groups of workers with out-dated skills.
Therefore, our approach ensures the comparability of the results over the years in
the most possible way.
We provide a short overview of the Danish apprenticeship system. For a more
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detailed description, see Wiborg and Cort (2010). Between 30 and 40 percent of
a cohort enters basic vocational education. As in states like Germany or Switzer-
land, the Danish apprenticeship system is a "dual system" in which apprentices re-
ceive formal schooling and training on the job. The first company training period
follows a one-year period of school-based training. During the company train-
ing itself, individuals also receive school-based training through approximately
six school-based training periods lasting around 10 weeks each. Apprenticeship
training can take up to 5.5 years, and most apprenticeships range from 3.5 to
4.5 years. Companies pay their apprentices during the training and the schooling
period. During the schooling period employers are reimbursed via the employ-
ers’ reimbursement fund, which is financed by a levy from all employers. Upon
graduation of the apprenticeship training program, a vocational student acquires
a qualification that corresponds directly to a specific occupational profile in the
labor market.
Social partners are actively working to ensure the quality and to specify the
requirements of each training program. The National Advisory Council for Ini-
tial Vocational Education and Training and the local training committees advise
colleges on local educational plans and other local training matters to ensure that
training requirements are fulfilled and apprenticeship graduates are equipped with
up-to-date skills. Vocational training is based on broad occupational profiles that
ensure that students acquire skills that are similar within each occupation and
are transferable between companies. Thus vocational training facilitates the labor
market mobility (Wiborg and Cort; 2010).
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3.4 Methods
The following chapter discusses general problems of estimating displacement
losses discussed in the literature, and presents our empirical methods to overcome
those problems. To explain our regression approach we rely on a simple model
from von Wachter and Bender (2006).
Assume that young workers wages or income are a function of their innate
skills ai and their mobility status. Thus let Di0 be a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether an individual left his or her training firm. Leavers include voluntary
movers who benefit from mobility and involuntary movers who are likely to be
low quality apprentices who leave their training firms because their employers did
not offer them a subsequent contract. Thus we have Di0 =Vi0+Ii0 where Vi0 = 1 if
the movement is voluntary and Ii0 = 1 if the movement is involuntary. The gain of
voluntary movement is δVt and the displacement loss is δIt . The goal of our study
is obtaining an estimate for the displacement loss δIt . Usually we are not able to
observe Vi0 and Ii0 separately. Therefore, we follow the evaluation literature and
identify a treatment group of involuntary movers and compare those movers to a
control group of stayers that are otherwise identical to our treatment group.
To identify a proper treatment group of involuntary movers the problem of
firm internal sorting of leavers is not the only problem which arises. The second
problem is the initial sorting of workers across firms. Displaced workers are dis-
proportionaly selected from firms with higher turnover rates which might attract
less able apprentices. As a result the average ability of workers from a leavers
firm might be lower than the average ability of workers of a stayers firm—as a
consequence our treatment and control group would not be identical. Thus let
a¯ j(i) be the average ability of workers in firm j. Finally, we can write the income
generating process as
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Yit = δItDi0 +(δVt−δIt)Vi0 +(ai− a¯ j(i))+ a¯ j(i)+ εi (3.1)
where εi is a random disturbance term. Thus income is determined by the
mobility status, an individual’s component relative to the average training firm
(ai− a¯ j(i)) and a firm specific component a¯ j(i). In general neither (ai− a¯ j(i)) nor
a¯ j(i) are observable by the econometricians and a simple OLS estimate of δVt after
t years would yield to:
plimδˆOLSIt = δIt +(δVt−δIt)
Cov(Vi0,Di0)
Var(Di0)
+
Cov(ai− a¯ j(i),Di0)
Var(Di0)
+
Cov(a¯ j(i),Di0)
Var(Di0)
(3.2)
Equation (3.2) shows three potential sources of bias. The second term on
the right hand side of equation (3.2) displays a bias which arises because of
the firm internal selection problem of movers and stayers. The third term dis-
plays the bias which arises because of an individual specific error term which
is not related to the average firm specific error. The fourth term on the right
hand side displays the error which arises because of a training firm specific er-
ror. We underestimate the displacement effect if voluntary movement is pre-
dominant ((δVt −δIt)Cov(Vi0,Di0)Var(Di0) Y > 0). In contrast we overestimate the displace-
ment effect if less able workers are likely to change their establishments more
often (
Cov(ai−a¯ j(i),Di0)
Var(Di0)
< 0) and if less able workers are sorted into firms with high
turnover (
Cov(a¯ j(i),Di0)
Var(Di0)
< 0).
Thus we have to assure that we distinguish involuntary movers who suffer a
real displacement from those who move voluntary from the firm. We rely on an
approach which is widely recognized in the literature of displaced workers and
create a sample of displaced workers leaving closing firms (e.g., Eliason and Stor-
rie; 2006; Hijzen et al.; 2010). In order to investigate a very homogeneous group
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of workers, we restrict our sample to workers in firms that close down in a short
time-window after the workers’ apprenticeship graduation—i.e. the firm closure
has to occur within the first three years after the graduation. Focusing exclusively
on displacement due to establishment closure diminishes the selection problems
because all workers are displaced regardless of their individual characteristics and
behavior. If firm closure is a proper treatment, we are able to remove the bias
which is displayed in the second term of equation (3.2).
However, unobserved individual heterogeneity and initial sorting of movers
and stayers across firms still bias the estimates of the displacement effect δIt .
Under the assumption that income reflects the workers skills, and the selection
into the treatment and control group or in the closing and non-closing firms is on
the basis of an unobserved permanent income component, we are able to remove
the bias displayed by the third and fourth term of equation (3.2) by applying the
following regression:
Yit = αi + γt +X ′itβ+D
k
itδk + εi (3.3)
Equation (3.3) has become the “gold” standard in the literature on displaced
workers. Yit is individual i’s annual earnings in year t, αi is an individual-level
fixed effect, γt is a vector of time effects, Xit includes time-varying individual
characteristics. As most available variables such as experience, tenure or industry
might be endogenous to the displacement, and therefore a form of displacement
costs themselves, we limit our control variables Xit to age a squared term of age
and a dummy for sex. Dkit is a vector of dummy variables indicating each year after
and during the individual’s displacement. k indicates the year since displacement.
In the following section we describe the data and will show exactly how we con-
struct our control group of stayers and identify our treatment group of involuntary
movers.
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3.5 Data and identification
In this section we will describe the data in detail. First, we will give some general
information and will describe how we select our sample and identify our treatment
and control groups. In the second part of this section we describe the variables that
we use for our investigation.
The ’Integrated Database for Labor Market Research’ (IDA) covers each sin-
gle individual and each single plant in Denmark from 1980 till 2004. The data
is based on administrative records collected by the Danish Bureau of Statistics.
There is no attrition with respect to individuals in IDA. The Danish Bureau of
Statistics keeps track of every single Danish resident and assigns him or her to
one and only one labor market state and plant in each year at a specific day in
November. The data provides detailed information on labor market performance,
such as earnings and experience, and a wide range of background characteristics
such as educational background and family characteristics (Iversen et al.; 2006).
3.5.1 Sample design
For our investigation sample we select different cohorts of individuals which grad-
uated from their apprenticeship training in different years between 1980 and 2004.
As common in the literature estimating displacement losses for large register
based data sets, we select a treatment group of displaced workers and a control
group of workers not suffering displacement for every graduation cohort. In par-
ticular, we define a worker as displaced if he or she leaves a training firm that is
out of business in the subsequent year. We follow Frederiksen and Westergaard-
Nielsen (2007) and use a variable in the IDA that indicates whether firms went
out of business. A problem present in all register based employer-employee data
sources is to identify a firm closure whenever establishments change their formal
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identification number but remain in business. Statistics Denmark has corrected
changes in the identity number for cases where it was obvious to Statistics Den-
mark that the firm remained in business. The main indicator used for the correc-
tion is the fraction of the workforce remaining employed. These corrections affect
less than five percent of all firms.
Our treatment group of displaced workers consists of apprentices who left
their training firm due to a firm closure within the first three years after their
apprenticeship graduation. Our control group consist of apprentices from the same
cohorts who graduated in firms which did not close down in the subsequent years.
The control group includes employees who stay with their training firm for at
least three years after their graduation. After those three years, we allow members
of the control group to change their firms or become unemployed. Some other
studies which mostly observe shorter periods of time create their counterfactual by
considering only workers who stay in their firm for the whole observation period.
As we are able to follow our individuals over a period of more than 18 years such
an approach would not be appropriate. In particular, as the Danish labor market is
very flexible and workers move between jobs even more than in the U.S.. Almost
two thirds of the population suffer spells of unemployment during their work live
and the average tenure is around 5.49 years for men and 5.45 years for women
(Bingley and Westergaard-Nielsen; 2003). Therefore, a control group of stayers
that remain in their training company for the whole observation period would not
be representative in our case—particularly, as young workers are even more likely
to move than older workers. As consequence we would end up with very few
observations for the control group by relying on the approach of former studies.
We select cohorts of apprenticeship graduates from 1983, 1984 1988, 1989,
1992, and 1999 entering the labor market under different bargaining systems and
economic conditions. The first two cohorts graduated in 1983 and 1984 were dis-
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placed between 1984 and 1987. We selected those two cohorts because we are
able to obtain enough relevant information for each cohort before the displace-
ment took place and we could assure that all workers of the treatment group were
displaced under the rigid wage bargaining system that was persistent up to 1987.
The treatment group of the cohorts from 1988 and 1989 were displaced between
1989 and 1992 during a period with a much more decentralized wage bargain-
ing system. The cohorts of 1994 were displaced until 1997 and the cohort of 1999
were displaced until 2002—a point in time were all wages were already negotiated
at the firm level.
For all graduation cohorts we select apprentices who are younger than 25 years
at the end of their training period and spent at least two years in their training firm
during their apprenticeship training. Gender-specific differences in the labor mar-
ket attachment and income are very small in Denmark, such that we decided to
keep male and female workers for our investigation. We dropped observations
of individuals which left the country and self employed individuals. We stayed
only with those individuals which are observable for at least 5 subsequent years
after their graduation. These restrictions assure that we have a particularly homo-
geneous sample of workers with similar labor market relevant skills at different
points in time.
3.5.2 Variables
Our variables contain individual and firm characteristics. Descriptive statistics on
all variables are in the appendix. We use two different independent variables for
the estimation according to equation (3.3). The first is the deflated annual sum of
all yearly labor market earnings from all labor market activities. The base year
for our deflation is 2000 and the variable is measured at some day in November.
The yearly income represents a measure of the entire monetary endowment gener-
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ated from working. Therefore, the yearly income includes all wages and income
from different jobs. A displacement loss measured in the category of the entire
yearly income represents the whole monetary loss and considers that individuals
might work in different kinds of small jobs that are not registered as their main
employment.
The other dependent variable measures the deflated hourly wages of the indi-
vidual’s main employer. Therefore, we can directly infer the displacement effect
on the employers wage setting process. For both variables we allow spells of zero
earnings, as spells of non-employment are a mayor consequence of a job loss. Re-
stricting our sample to individuals who never suffer from non-employment after
loosing their jobs would not be adequate as those individuals are a particular—
high ability—group of workers who manage to find a subsequent job directly.
However, we will precisely investigate which part of the income losses is related
to unemployment and which part is related to wage reductions.
The independent variables in Xit are restricted to age, a squared age term and a
dummy for gender. Moreover, we incorporate year dummies for every observation
year. Like already mentioned we keep the control variables very sparse as most
variables which we are able to use as control variables are endogenous to the dis-
placement, and attribute to the displacement loss itself. Yet in some specification
we include the amount of yearly working days as additional control to infer which
part of the displacement loss is due to unemployment spells and which part refers
to a reduction in wages.
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3.6 Results
This section presents our estimation results. In Table 3.1 to 3.7 we present the
results for the coefficient estimates of δIt from equation 3.1 for each cohort of
apprenticeship graduates. The first rows present the estimates for the first year
after displacement by cohort year, the second rows presents the estimates for the
second year after displacement and so forth. We present the estimates for the first
4 years after displacement as these years are observable for all cohorts. Yet we
performed all regressions for the entire observation period but the differences are
most significant during the first four years after displacement. In Figure 3.1 to 3.7
we plot the estimates of δIt to illustrate the results graphically.
3.6.1 OLS results
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 show the raw OLS estimates. The dependent variable is
the deflated yearly income of all working activities up to certain date in November.
The only controls that we incorporate are year dummies to capture the general
economic trend, sex, age and a squared term of age.
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Figure 3.1: OLS results
Note: The bars represent the absolute amount of displacement losses. The dashed line represents
the introduction of the flexible wage bargaining system.
The result show that displacement losses are substantial and significant even
4 years after displacement. Moreover, the losses rise substantially for each cohort
since 1983. The raw displacement loss for the cohort of 1983 is about 67000 Kro-
ner (12000 Dollar) of the real yearly November income and increases to about
79000 Kroner (14000 Dollar) for the cohort of apprenticeship graduates from
1999. Thus for the cohort of 1999 income losses in the first year after displace-
ment are by about 10000 Kroners bigger than for the cohort of 1983. Displace-
ment losses start rising for the cohort of 1988. This break is coincident with the
time the wage bargaining system was decentralized substantially. This tendency
is even more evident in the second year after displacement. Both rows show that
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displacement losses start growing from the 1988 cohort onwards. For the third
and the fourth year after displacement, the displacement losses grow after 1988
but decline again for the cohort of 1999.
Table 3.1: Displacement losses: OLS estimates
Years after displacement:
1 2 3 4
1983 cohort: -67015.21 *** -45123.81 *** -33389.12 *** -32761.95 ***
1984 cohort: -68756.07 *** -48552.51 *** -35734.65 *** -38539.56 ***
1988 cohort: -71889.52 *** -53810.87 *** -47489.02 *** -41959.55 ***
1989 cohort: -77620.47 *** -58846.54 *** -49828.40 *** -49894.34 ***
1994 cohort: -77240.39 *** -66589.11 *** -57646.57 *** -45981.06 ***
1999 cohort: -79524.30 *** -64174.08 *** -38568.81 *** -40559.87 ***
Note: All data are drawn from the IDA 1980-2004
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
3.6.2 Fixed effect results
Up to this point we did not consider that workers might differ in their unobserved ability
or training firm characteristics. Therefore, we include worker fixed effects in the next
specification. Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 show the results.
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Figure 3.2: Fixed effects results I
Note: The bars represent the absolute amount of displacement losses. The dashed line represents
the introduction of the flexible wage bargaining system.
Including worker fixed effects reduces displacement losses by half. In the first year
after displacement earnings losses drop from 67000 to about 27000 Kroners for the cohort
of 1983. In the cohort of 1999 the displacement loss decreases from about 79000 Kroners
to about 41000 Kroners. Yet we observe that displacement losses rise substantially for the
first and the second year after displacement. Therefore, the results of Table 3.2 and Figure
3.2 are qualitatively similar to those of Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1.
The rising trend in displacement losses is not as evident in the fourth year after dis-
placement. In the fourth year after displacement, the negative effects remain only signif-
icant for the cohort of 1988 and 1989. For the cohort of 1983 the effect is even slightly
positive significant now. This effect is rather surprising and it is hard to explain why
it occurs only for the 1983 cohort. However, the effect is very small and only weakly
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significant.
Table 3.2: Displacement losses: Fixed effect I
Years after displacement:
1 2 3 4
1983 cohort: -26789.74 *** - 5776.15 * 6017.2 * 6329.95 **
1984 cohort: -33437.09 *** -13855.69 *** -1091.67 -4338.03
1988 cohort: -43441.85 *** -25968.44 *** -19736.63 *** -14329.64 ***
1989 cohort: -50852.09 *** -31985.49 *** -23213.63 *** -23615.14 ***
1994 cohort: -39209.26 *** -27798.44 *** -18469.25 *** -7289.68
1999 cohort: -40964.7 *** -24634.47 *** 1912.23 4536.50
Note: All data are drawn from the IDA 1980-2004
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
As found by Eliason and Storrie (2006) displacement losses vary to a great deal ac-
cording to the economic conditions under which individuals are displaced. Therefore,
increasing displacement losses might be a pure reflection of economic cycles. Indeed,
after the crisis in the early 1980s—in which unemployment rose to about 10 percent—a
short period of recovery followed between 1984 and 1987. This period of recovery might
be a possible reason that displacement losses for the cohorts of 1983 and 1984 are smaller
than for the cohorts of 1988 and 1989. Unemployment rose to about 12 percent between
1988 and 1993. Yet the recovery period between 1984 and 1987 was rather short and
unemployment remained on a high level of about 7.5 per cent. Moreover, displacement
losses are still bigger for the cohorts after 1994. The years after 1994 where accompanied
by a substantial economic boom, reducing unemployment to about 5 per cent within 5
years. Moreover, the youth unemployment for individuals under 25—i.e. our population
of interest— was with 10.6 per cent substantially larger until 1985 than in all periods that
followed.
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We do not argue that displacement losses in Denmark are independent of macro eco-
nomic conditions but our results indicate that the increase in displacement losses under the
more flexible wage bargaining system are not pure results of a change in macro economic
conditions.
3.6.3 Explorative results
This next subsection aims at investigating the results of the previous section in more de-
tail. Specifically we aim at investigating the reasons for the patterns of the displacement
losses. Up to this point the we only included explanatory variables that are strictly ex-
ogenous to the event of displacement. In this subsection we will add working days to
the set of explanatory variables.Working days are not exogenous to the event of displace-
ment but we still include this variable in the set of explanatory variables to investigate
how our results change because of the inclusion of working days. Furthermore, we will
replace our dependent variable of yearly income by two other variables. First we will per-
form our regressions with hourly wages as independent variable to show how the single
employers wage setting evolves after a worker’s displacement. Second, we will create
dummy variables indicating the workers position in the firms wage distribution to infer
in which hierarchical position of the post-displacement firm the displaced workers end
up. Finally we will investigate the displacement losses of workers with different types of
apprenticeship trainings.
Unemployment spells
In contrast to the U.S. in European countries displacement losses are mostly attributed to
spells of non-employment and differences in the labor market attachment. Fortunately, our
data contains detailed information about how many days a worker was employed at any
given year. Thus to investigate whether displacement losses are mostly attributed to spells
of non-employment, we include the total amount of yearly working days as additional
control in the next specification. In this way we control for the fact that displaced workers
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might have a lower labor force attachment than non-displaced workers. Table 3.3 and
Figure 3.3 present the results—as before worker fixed effects are included.
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Figure 3.3: Fixed effects results II
Note: The bars represent the absolute amount of displacement losses. The dashed line represents
the introduction of the flexible wage bargaining system.
If we control for differences in work days our results display displacement losses for
workers having the same work experience. Thus under the assumption that unobserved
ability is constant over our investigation period, the remaining displacement loss describes
the wage penalty that a worker has to accept as consequence of displacement — even if the
respective worker is constantly employed after his or her job loss. In contrast to the former
results there are no significant displacement losses for the cohorts of 1983 and 1984 within
the first four years after displacement. Some effects are even slightly positive significant.
All displacement losses can be attributed to spells of unemployment for the cohorts of
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apprenticeship graduates being displaced during the rigid wage bargaining regime before
1987. This result is in line with former evidence from Europe.
In contrast the results look different for the cohorts between 1988 and 1999. Even
after controlling for differences in the labor market attachment, we find remaining dis-
placement losses which are in the order of about 7000 and 23000 Kroners for the first year
after displacement and -2000 and -18000 Kroners for the forth year after displacement.
In other words, after 1987 even displaced workers that remain constantly employed—i.e.
find a job directly after being displaced—suffer income losses. This result indicates that
under a flexible wage bargaining system employers can adjust the income for displaced
workers and pay them a lower amount than their non-displaced counterparts. Such a pic-
ture is more closely to the evidence that was found in the US where displacement losses
remain substantially even for the employed.
Table 3.3: Displacement losses: Fixed effect II
Years after displacement:
1 2 3 4
1983 cohort: 2311.25 3786.62 8030.2*** 4977.27**
1984 cohort: -83.75 -1559.74 1292.76 -2590.13
1988 cohort: -7214.54*** -5093.14*** -6386.73*** -6623.43***
1989 cohort: -10884.27*** -8945.69*** -6239.43** -8416.31***
1994 cohort: -23856.68*** -19635.39*** -19795.58*** -17275.34***
1999 cohort: -19481.82*** -12786.7*** -1357.26 -1911.48
Note: All data are drawn from the IDA 1980-2004
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
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Hourly wages
Even if income losses remain after controlling for differences in the labor market attach-
ment, those income losses might stem from a reduction in working hours for displaced
workers and might not be attributed to a wage reduction imposed by the employer. There-
fore, the next specification replaces the dependent variable of the total yearly income
from all work activities by the hourly wage at the main employer. Table 3.4 and Figure
3.4 display the results.
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Figure 3.4: Hourly wages
Note: The bars represent the absolute amount of displacement losses. The dashed line represents
the introduction of the flexible wage bargaining system.
The evidence shows that displacement losses are either slightly positive significant
or not significant different from zero for the cohorts of 1983 and 1984. However, for
the cohorts of apprenticeship graduates being displaced in periods with a very flexible
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wage bargaining system, displacement losses are substantial and increase considerably.
Moreover, displacement losses in hourly wages do not decline within the first four periods
after displacement but rather increase somewhat in later periods. The rise in wage loss is
in line with former evidence from Sweden (Eliason and Storrie; 2006).
Table 3.4: Displacement losses: Hourly wages
Years after displacement:
1 2 3 4
1983 cohort: 12.97 *** 7.31*** 7.3*** 4.91**
1984 cohort: 6.23** 2.4 0.54 -6.95***
1988 cohort: -9.46*** -10.64*** -14.61*** -14.47***
1989 cohort: -7.35** -7.14** -11.43*** -16.57***
1994 cohort: -13.8*** -19.13*** -22.8*** -23.43***
1999 cohort: -19.88*** -25.27*** -26.69*** -21.61***
Note: All data are drawn from the IDA 1980-2004
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
Firms income distribution
If the wage bargaining system is very rigid because wages are fixed according to certain
standards such as education, age and tenure, workers with similar work experience and
comparable educational degrees should receive rather similar wages. Thus they should
end up in similar parts of the wage distribution within the respective firm—in particular
if the workers are young and do not differ systematically in their unobserved character-
istics and their tenure. The employer has less possibilities to pay new hires lower wages
or pay internal workers firm specific bonuses. Therefore, we should expect that young
displaced apprenticeship graduates end up in similar position of their new firms wage
distribution than those apprenticeship graduates that remained in their training firm if the
wage bargaining system is rigid.
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To test this expectation, we use information for every worker within each single firm
to calculate the median of each firms income distribution. Afterwards we create a dummy
which is 1 whenever the worker receives an income that is above the median income
in the respective firm and zero otherwise. Such indicator displays whether workers end
up in rather different parts of their entire firms income distribution. Moreover, such an
approach takes into account that displaced workers might end up in firms that pay lower
wages in general. We use this variable as dependent variable in a linear probability model
including, year dummies, gender, age and yearly working days as explanatory variables.
Moreover, we include worker fixed effects. Table 3.5 and Figure 3.5 display the results of
this approach.
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Figure 3.5: Income distribution
Note: The bars represent the absolute amount of displacement losses. The dashed line represents
the introduction of the flexible wage bargaining system.
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The table shows slightly negative but significant effects for the cohorts of 1983 and
1984 indicating that displaced workers are slightly less likely to end up in the upper tail of
their firms wage distribution than their non-displaced counterparts. In contrast, the effect
for the later cohorts for whom the wages are much more flexible are far bigger. Displaced
workers are far less likely to end up in the upper tail of their firms income distribution
than their non-displaced counterparts. Thus in times of a more flexible bargaining sys-
tem, displaced workers are more likely to end up in lower parts of their firms income
distribution.
Table 3.5: Displacement losses: 50 percentile
Years after displacement:
1 2 3 4
1983 cohort: -0.048*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.034***
1984 cohort: -0.036*** -0.064*** -0.044*** -0.052***
1988 cohort: -0.135*** -0.138*** -0.142*** -0.135***
1989 cohort: -0.141*** -0.129*** -0.137*** -0.142***
1994 cohort: -0.173*** -0.214*** -0.194*** -0.213***
1999 cohort: -0.092*** -0.194*** -0.186*** -0.101***
Note: All data are drawn from the IDA 1980-2004
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
Worker heterogeneity
Thus far we only considered the group of apprenticeship graduates as a whole. However,
even if the group of apprenticeship graduates is very homogenous in comparison to the
whole workforce, there are many different apprenticeship programs that lead to very dif-
ferent qualifications and might differ substantially with respect to their amount of firm
specific human capital. Some apprenticeship programs might lead to skills that are easily
transferable across jobs, firms and industries whereas other skills are not.
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To create an even more homogenous sub-sample of workers this section looks on
different groups of apprenticeship graduates separately. In particular, we focus on com-
mercial apprenticeship graduates and apprenticeship graduates from the manufacturing
sector. First, commercial and manufacturing workers represent the biggest apprenticeship
programs where most people undertake their training. Second, both groups are usually
considered to differ substantially in their human capital specificity. Commercial appren-
ticeship graduates are usually considered as workers with rather general human capital.
Most commercial workers are white collar workers such as secretaries, clercs or sales-
men who can transfer their skills easily. Manufacturing workers in contrast are viewed as
workers with rather specific human capital, as manufacturing workers perform very spe-
cific technical tasks to produce a particular sort of product (Doeringer and Piore; 1971;
Janssen and Pfeifer; 2009). Indeed, many former studies find higher displacement losses
for manufacturing workers than for commercial or service workers.
We report fixed effect specifications with additional controls for yearly working days.
Table 3.6 and Figure 3.6 show the results for commercial apprenticeship graduates.
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Figure 3.6: Income: Commercial
Note: The bars represent the absolute amount of displacement losses. The dashed line represents
the introduction of the flexible wage bargaining system.
68
Chapter 3: Wage flexibility and displacement losses.
!"#$$$%
!"$$$$%
!&#$$$%
!&$$$$%
!#$$$%
$%
#$$$%
&$$$$%
&#$$$%
&% "% '% (%
!
"
#
$ %
&
' (
)
* +
,
"
' (
)
' -
$ +
)
"
$ '
!"#$.'#/"$'0(.1%#*",")2'
&)*'%
&)*(%
&)**%
&)*)%
&))(%
&))*%
Figure 3.7: Income: Manufacturing
Note: The bars represent the absolute amount of displacement losses. The dashed line represents
the introduction of the flexible wage bargaining system.
The pattern looks similar to the results we obtain for the whole sample. Displacement
losses for the cohorts of 1983 and 1984 are rather small and insignificant after we control
for differences in working days. For the latter cohorts displacement losses start to grow at
least for the first two years after displacement and are highest for the cohort of 1999. For
the latter cohorts the estimated displacement losses are even somewhat bigger than for the
entire sample.
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Table 3.6: Displacement losses: Commercial
Years after displacement:
1 2 3 4
1983 cohort: 977.7274 -2241.553 4305.456 1725.105
1984 cohort: 242.5153 -3827.422 -1660.619 -6050.061 *
1988 cohort: -4589.795 ** -3797.614 * -8963.984 *** -8143.294 **
1989 cohort: -9355.726 *** -8451.106 *** -6141.033 ** -10041.75 ***
1994 cohort: -16059.49 *** -13773.79 *** -13243.52 *** -7759.367 **
1999 cohort: -20155.68 *** -17950.15 *** -3894.654 -13426.97 *
Note: All data are drawn from the IDA 1980-2004
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
Table 3.7: Displacement losses: Manufacturing
Years after displacement:
1 2 3 4
1983 cohort: -7877.271 1483.737 9649.177 4507.252
1984 cohort: -10966.44 * -12886.49 ** -7451.046 -1286.753
1988 cohort: -13733.6 ** -13267.74 ** -7143.845 -10394.38 *
1989 cohort: -16723.3 *** -10062.95 * -7219.173 -4417.947
1994 cohort: -11412.64 * -2210.99 6032.771 -568.7031
1999 cohort: -20822 ** -9654.591 8823.77 5028.253
Note: All data are drawn from the IDA 1980-2004
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
In order to compare those results to the sample of manufacturing workers Table 3.7
and Figure 3.7 present the results.
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The pattern for manufacturing workers contrasts the pattern for commercial workers
to some extend. Similar to the commercial workers we do not find no displacement losses
for the 1983 cohort. However, for the cohorts from 1984 to 1999 we find big displace-
ment losses for the first year after displacement and smaller displacement losses for the
second year after displacement. In the third and fourth year after displacement we almost
find no significant displacement losses. One possible explanation for this pattern is that
displacement losses of manufacturing workers depend less on the changes in the wage
bargaining system than displacement losses of commercial workers. Displacement losses
of manufacturing workers might be much stronger related to the loss of specific human
rather than to the nature of the wage bargaining system. In contrast commercial workers
have more general human capital that is easily transferable across firms. Thus commer-
cial workers might suffer less from the loss of specific human capital but might be much
stronger affected by the changes in the wage bargaining system.
To sum up, we have shown that displacement losses are bigger in periods with flexible
wages—independent of whether workers are displaced in boom or recession periods. In
addition, displacement losses under flexible wages remain substantially even if we control
for differences in the labor market attachment which indicates that displacement losses
under flexible bargaining systems arise in particular because employers can impose wage
penalties on new hires.
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3.7 Discussion and conclusion.
In our final section we give a short overview and discussion of the results. The aim of
this chapter was to contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we wanted to show how
displacement losses vary under different forms of wage bargaining regimes to draw con-
clusions about the genuine differences in estimated displacement losses between Europe
and the US. Second, we wanted to show how displacement losses differ for individuals
that perform different types of tasks in different occupations.
With respect to the first objective of this chapter, our findings reveal that displacement
losses in the first years after displacement are substantially bigger under flexible wage
bargaining systems than under rigid wages. This result holds either for recessions and
boom periods. In particular, wage and income losses that are attributed to wage reductions
within subsequent firms rose over time. One possible explanation for such a pattern is
that employers, under flexible wage bargaining systems, impose wage penalties on new
hires (former displaced workers). For example, as wage reductions are often perceived
as unfair and demotivating, employers can adjust their costs in economic downturns by
paying lower wages to new hires rather than reduce the wages of longer tenured workers.
Moreover, as employer learning about new hires is costly, employers can impose wage
penalties on those new hires—such penalties might be particularly high if those new hires
lost their former jobs due to a reason that is unknown by the employer. Another reason
might be that employers are more likely to pay wage premiums or long term incentive
wages to internal candidates under flexible wage systems—displaced workers might forgo
such bonuses after loosing former jobs. Such processes might induce higher displacement
losses under more flexible wage systems, in particular in the first years after displacement
when information asymmetries are particularly high.
Moreover, former literature argues that a flexible wage formation process reduces
unemployment spells and lay-offs, as wages can be adjusted according to the economic
conditions. However, the results for Denmark seem to contradict this view to some degree
as not only displacement losses according to wage reductions but also the entire displace-
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ment losses—including losses caused by unemployment—rose over time with increasing
wage flexibility. One potential explanation for this contradiction is that employment pro-
tection was always very low in Denmark—even in the early 1980s when the wage bar-
gaining system was very rigid. Therefore, employers might be less reluctant to pay higher
wages because during bad economic conditions employers can easily lay those high paid
workers off. Yet, from our investigation we cannot tell whether unemployment would
have been higher if Denmark would have stayed with its rigid wage bargaining system.
Therefore, our first major contribution to the literature lies in showing an increase in
displacement losses after the transition to a flexible wage bargaining system in Denmark.
Former studies only guessed about the relationship between displacement losses and wage
flexibility to explain why the empirical literature on displacement losses differs so sub-
stantially between Europe and the USA. However, we are the first that are able to show
that effect by exploiting an exogenous change in the wage bargaining sytsem. As most
European countries have a much more centralized wage bargaining system than the U.S.,
we provide one plausible explanation why researchers find bigger displacement losses in
the U.S. than in most European countries .
With respect to the second objective of the chapter , we show that the transition to a
flexible wage bargaining system affects mostly commercial apprentices but not so much
apprentices from the manufacturing sector. Such a result indicates that the nature of the
wage setting process affects mostly workers with general human capital but not with more
firm specific human capital.
Therefore our second contribution is that we show an interaction between the type of
human capital, the flexibility of the wage bargaining process and workers displacement
losses. Presumably the fact that workers and firms invest together in firm specific human
capital and have a higher interest in long term relationships detains firms from exploiting
their market power under a more flexible wage bargaining system. Consequently dis-
placement losses of apprentices from the manufacturing sector are much more related to
losses of firm specific human capital rather than to the flexibility of the wage bargaining
system.
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The second and the third chapter of this dissertation investigated different relations
between tasks and income. However, income is not the only labor market outcome that
drives individuals’ behavior in the labor market. In fact, income is only one factor—and
for many people not even the most important factor—that people consider when they have
to decide which job to choose, how much work effort to impose or whether to work at all.
Therefore, research should aim at investigating other labor market outcomes and show
how those labor market outcomes are related to the task-based view. The next chapter 4
provides a first step in this direction by investigating the relation between job satisfaction
and contents of tasks.
In contrast to the workers income, job satisfaction considers much more aspects of an
individuals work life and reveals insights that we cannot obtain by investigating wages or
income. In particular the fourth chapter aims at investigating how gender-specific social
norms influence the relationship between the performance of different types of tasks and
job satisfaction.
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B.1 Tables
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics: Displaced workers
Variable Obs Mean
Yearly income 81175 150415.500
Working days 81175 250.296
Age 81175 27.686
Female 3388 0.402
Note: All data are drawn from the IDA.
Table B.2: Descriptive statistics: Non-displaced workers
Variable Obs Mean
Yearly income 401060 177491.700
Working days 401060 290.983
Age 401060 27.947
Female 16732 0.459
Note: All data are drawn from the IDA.
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Occupational stereotypes, gender
segregation and job satisfaction
4.1 Introduction
Despite the great strides towards gender equality in many western countries over the past
50 years, gender segregation remains persistent , with women crowded into lower-paid
jobs with worse career prospectives (Kidd and Goninon; 2000; Johnson and Solon; 1996).
While earlier literature links gender segregation to theories of employer discrimination,
a more recent theory by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) links occupational segregation to
gender-specific job stereotypes. Specifically, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) incorporate the
sociological concept of identity into an economic framework. They propose a utility func-
tion in which identity is associated with different social categories and the ways in which
people in these categories are expected to behave. In their model individuals suffer a util-
ity loss if their action does not correspond to gender prescriptions for behavior. Akerlof
and Kranton (2000) argue that people in occupations associated with the opposite gender
often have ambiguous feelings about their work because they violate their own identity or
that of their coworkers. Thus Akerlof and Kranton (2000) argue that gender segregation
in the labor market might remain persistent because many people refuse to choose a job
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stereotypically associated with the opposite gender. In line with this theory, empirical
studies in psychology find that individuals strongly stereotype occupations (McCauley
and Thangavelu; 1991; Shinar; 1975; White and White; 2006). However, no evidence
exists that occupational stereotypes affect the utility and preferences of individuals.
As identity and individual utility are usually impossible to measure, providing empiri-
cal evidence showing that occupational stereotypes influence individual utility is difficult.
However, we argue that providing evidence on the relationship between self-reported job
satisfaction and occupational stereotypes is a first step to more fully understanding how
social influences affect gender-specific preferences in the labor market and why gender
segregation remains persistent even in countries where women and men have equal rights.
Therefore, to estimate the relationship between gender-specific stereotypes and job satis-
faction, this paper follows and combines two kinds of empirical literature. First, we follow
the economic literature on self-reported job satisfaction, which views self-reported job sat-
isfaction as a sub-utility from working (Clark and Oswald; 1996; Clark; 1997). Second,
we extrapolate the strand of psychological literature that uses different kinds of indices to
measure occupational stereotypes in the labor market (McCauley and Thangavelu; 1991;
Shinar; 1975; White and White; 2006).
Fortunately, we have access to a unique data set that not only allows us to create an in-
dex for occupational stereotypes but also contains a variety of categorical job satisfaction
measures. The major novelty of our work is that we are the first that can create a ordinal
measure of the gender specific stereotypes for individual’s job that is representative for
the German population. Specifically, we use the German “BiBB/IAB Strukturerhebung,”
which contains data on 30,000 individuals and is representative for the German work-
force. In addition to the job satisfaction measures, the data contains detailed information
on each individual’s job tasks and a variable that indicates whether the individual consid-
ers her or his job to be more appropriate for females or males. We use this information to
create a conditional index indicating whether society on average associates each observed
individual’s job with female or male stereotypes. To our knowledge the BiBB/IAB survey
is the only data set containing this kind of information.
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Our results reveal structural gender differences in the correlations between occupa-
tional gender stereotypes and job satisfaction. They show that women report lower satis-
faction values in stereotypically male jobs, an effect most pronounced in satisfaction with
work climate and the contents of tasks. One notable exception is income satisfaction, for
which women on average report higher values for stereotypically male jobs. In contrast,
men report higher satisfaction values in stereotypically male jobs. These results are fairly
stable, and we are able to confirm them for a variety of empirical specifications. The
results remain robust when we control for unpleasant working conditions such as heavy
lifting or night shifts which might predominate in male jobs.
The primary concern with our correlations is that individuals select themselves into
female or male jobs for different reasons and are likely to be fairly different in terms of
their tastes and abilities. Hypothetically women (men) in stereotypically male (female)
jobs may be more likely to favor job characteristics in stereotypically male (female) jobs
than women (men) in female (male) jobs. Therefore, pure correlations of the relationship
between job satisfaction and occupational stereotypes are likely to underestimate the av-
erage effect of performing a job that is related to stereotypes associated with the opposite
sex.
We overcome this endogeneity problem by applying an instrumental variable regres-
sion. As an instrument we use our index for occupational stereotypes and calculate the
average of this index for each individual’s region of residence. We argue that any indi-
vidual living in a region where stereotypically male jobs predominate is more likely to
choose a stereotypically male job. Nonetheless, the predominance of stereotypically male
jobs should not directly affect the individual’s job satisfaction. Our IV estimates confirm
our correlations, as we find that men report higher satisfaction values for all satisfaction
dimensions in stereotypically male jobs than in stereotypically female jobs. Women, in
contrast, report lower satisfaction values. However, when we consider the endogeneity of
job choice, our standard errors increase substantially, and the effects remain significant
only for satisfaction with work climate.
Our results show a relationship between occupational stereotypes and self-reported
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job satisfaction. Such a relationship might have far-reaching consequences for policy
makers who wish to reduce gender-specific differences in the labor market. In particular,
if stereotypes affect the job choice behavior of individuals, then labor market policies
such as female quotas, anti-discrimination laws, or company policies aimed at facilitating
the combination of work and family life might have little effect on reducing occupational
segregation and the resultant gender wage gap.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents a bried
literature review. Section 3.3 presents the data set and the construction of our index for
occupational stereotypes in detail, and section 3.4 describes the estimation methods. Sec-
tion 3.5 presents the results, and section 3.6 both concludes and provides and discusses
the results in the light of the economic literature.
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4.2 Data
This section provides the details of the data and the measurement of our index for occu-
pational stereotypes. For the entire investigation, we use the 1991/92 wave of the Qual-
ification and Career Survey, carried out by the German Federal Institute for Vocational
Training (“Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung”) and the Research Institute of the Federal
Employment Service (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung). To our knowl-
edge, this wave of the Qualification and Career Survey is the only data set containing a
variable that allows the construction of a variable for occupational gender stereotypes.
The survey is a representative one percent sample of the German workforce, containing
roughly 30,000 observations and a wide range of individual and workplace-related vari-
ables.
We restrict our sample to West German residents, for whom there were no missing
values in our main variables of interest. This restriction leaves us with 11,660 observations
for men and 7,336 observations for women. We choose this restriction because the fall of
the Berlin wall in 1989 and the reunification of Germany in 1991 had negative influences
on job satisfaction in East Germany, given the tremendous uncertainty of East German
workers about their ability to compete in the job market. As Frijters et al. (2004) show,
job satisfaction in East Germany was exceptionally low in the years around 1991. The
East German industrial sector in particular was badly affected by an economic downturn,
with many people in the industry losing their jobs after reunification. As industrial jobs are
linked to stereotypically male jobs, the consequences of the reunification might bias our
estimates. Subsection 3.1 presents our dependent variables on job satisfaction, subsection
3.2 explains in detail how we construct or measure for gender specific stereotypes, and
section 3.3 describes the control variables.
4.2.1 Dependent variables
Our dependent variables measure different dimensions of job satisfaction on a four-point
scale ranging from being very unsatisfied to being very satisfied. We argue that such a job
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satisfaction measure is a valid indicator of an individual’s job utility, covering all kinds of
factors that are connected to that individual’s job. The first variable measures general job
satisfaction; the second, measures satisfaction with work climate; the third, satisfaction
with the contents of tasks; and the fourth satisfaction with income. The exact questions
are as follows1:
• How satisfied are you with your occupational activity, considering every aspect of
it?
• How satisfied are you with your occupational activity, considering the work cli-
mate?
• How satisfied are you with your occupational activity, considering the form and
content of your tasks?
• How satisfied are you with your income?2
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present descriptive statistics for all satisfaction measures.
Table 4.1: Job satisfaction: Women
Satisfaction dimension Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Very unsatisfied 1.42 1.96 1.57 4.66
Unsatisfied 6.9 8 8.7 23.69
Satisfied 59.39 51.38 57.84 59.28
Very satisfied 32.29 38.66 31.9 12.36
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
Columns contain percentages for men on 4-point Lickert scales.
1Some economists worry about the reliability of these kinds of satisfaction measures. Never-
theless, psychologists use these measures widely. Therefore, as Clark and Oswald (1996) argue,
we should interpret this use as validating the seriousness of these kinds of investigations. More-
over, these and similar kinds of research are finding increasing acceptance, even within economics
(Frey and Stutzer; 2002).
2The original german questions are: Wie zufrieden sind Sie alles in allem mit Ihrer derzeitigen
beruflichen Tätigkeit? Sind Sie zufrieden in Ihrer Tätigkeit in Bezug auf: Betriebsklima? Sind Sie
zufrieden in Ihrer Tätigkeit in Bezug auf: Art und Inhalt der Tätigkeit? Sind Sie zufrieden in Ihrer
Tätigkeit in Bezug auf: Einkommen?
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Table 4.2: Job satisfaction: Men
Satisfaction dimension Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Very unsatisfied 0.93 1.8 0.81 2.41
Unsatisfied 5.45 8.87 6.99 18.83
Satisfied 63.35 56.08 61.8 65.59
Very satisfied 30.27 33.25 30.4 13.17
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
Columns contain percentages for men on 4-point Lickert scales.
All measures show a reasonably typical picture for these kinds of satisfaction mea-
sures (see e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald; 2004). Most individuals report being either
very satisfied or satisfied. However, a tendency exists for individuals to report lower sat-
isfaction values for their income than for other dimensions of job satisfaction. Only 12
percent of the women and 13 percent of the men are very satisfied with their income. In
contrast, 38 percent of the women and 33 percent of the men are very satisfied with their
work climate. Women report the highest satisfaction category slightly more often than
men. Only for income satisfaction do women report lower values.
Our variable of main interest is an index measuring the socially expected stereotype
of a job. The next subsection describes in detail how we construct our stereotype index.
4.2.2 Explanatory variable: occupational stereotypes
In general, creating a valid measure for occupational stereotypes is fairly difficult. In
particular, for large and representative data sets, information for creating such a measure
is usually not available. Some psychological studies simply use the percentage of females
within a certain occupation. However, such an approach might be misleading, as perceived
stereotypes might not follow these patterns.
Therefore, we propose calculating a conditional reference measure for occupational
gender stereotypes. We argue that our measure displays the majority’s gender-specific
association of a job and is a valid measure for occupational stereotypes in the German
population.
To calculate our index for gender-stereotyped occupations, we rely on a particular
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variable in our data set. One question asks individuals whether they think that their jobs
can be performed only by men, only by women, or by both sexes equally3:
• Can your job be performed equally by men and women if they have the same back-
ground?
The possible answers are “only by a woman,” “better by a woman,” “equally by women
and men,” “better by a man” or “only by a man4.”
Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics of this variable for women and men separately.
Table 4.3: Occupational sex stereotypes.
Gender: male female
only by woman 0.03 3.65
better by woman 0.18 13.31
by man and woman equally 60.28 82.73
better by man 23.61 0.26
only by man 15.89 0.05
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
Columns contain percentages for men and women.
Not surprisingly, a fairly low percentage of men say that their own job could not be
performed by a man or would be performed better by a woman. However, about 4 percent
of all females say that their jobs could not be performed by a man at all, and about 13
percent believe that it would be better performed by a woman. In contrast, about 40
percent of all men report that their jobs could not be performed by women or performed
as well by women.
To describe the occupation of an individual, we use detailed information on the tasks
that an individual performs. Participants were asked to mark on a list what kinds of tasks
3Similar measures are quite common in the psychological literature investigating the sexual
stereotypes of occupations (White et al.; 1998). However, most of these measures are conducted
in small samples.
4The original german question is: Kann Ihre Tätigkeit von einem Mann und von einer Frau
gleich gut ausgeübt werden, wenn sie über due notwendige Ausbildung verfügen? The original
german answers are: Von Frauen und Männern gleich gut Nur von einer Frau Eher von einer Frau
Eher von einem Mann Nur von einem Mann
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they have to perform in their jobs. We report the descriptive statistics on the task measures
separately for women and men in the appendix. This information helps us to construct a
valid measure for occupational stereotypes.
To create the index, we first run a regression of the following form:
pi = Tiλ+ εi (4.1)
where pi is the variable on gender job stereotypes which is 0 when the job is viewed
as most appropriate for females and 4 if it is most appropriate for males. Ti is a vector
containing a set of dummies for all of our task indicators. λ is the respective coefficient
vector and ε the error term.
In Table ?? in the appendix we show the results of the regression according to equa-
tion 4.1. Table ?? shows that nearly all tasks enter highly significantly into the regression,
indicating that tasks are a core determinant for occupational stereotypes. Tasks such as
dealing with machines, driving vehicles, or supervising personnel show positive signif-
icant values, indicating that people on average view such tasks as stereotypically male.
Tasks such as cleaning, care-giving, or teaching show negative significant coefficient val-
ues, indicating that people on average view such tasks as stereotypically female.
To construct our index, we obtain the predicted values from equation 4.1 (Pi : pˆi =
Tiλˆ). Pi will give us a proper indicator for occupational gender stereotypes persistent in
society because the index measures the average occupational stereotype of an individual’s
job. For example, a job in which an individual performs tasks such as preparing food,
serving and accommodating, cleaning, disposing garbage, buying and selling, writing,
teaching and care taking leads to a value of Pi = 0.95. In contrast, a job with tasks such
as repairing, driving and working on buildings lead to a value of Pi = 3.5. Therefore, our
index indicates that the first job is a stereotype female job because 0.95 is a rather lower
value of Pi whereas the second job is a stereotype male job because of a high value of Pi.
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4.2.3 Control variables
In addition to our variables of main interest, our data set contains a variety of individual
and job characteristics allowing us to control for influences on job satisfaction, influences
not directly related to occupational stereotypes. We observe an individual’s age in years,
and we create a categorical variable for the worker’s type of education. The first category
of the education variable contains low-educated people such as those with no university
or apprenticeship degree. The second category contains medium-educated people with
an apprenticeship degree, and the third contains high-educated people with a university
degree5.
In addition, we observe weekly working hours and monthly income, which we ob-
serve in 16 categories. We assign midpoints to these income categories and treat the
variable as continuous, as DiNardo and Pischke (1997) did when using this data. We are
also able to observe certain job characteristics, not usually observable in most data sets.
We know whether a worker carries or lifts heavy weights, works in wet and cold or smoky
and dusty/dirty/noisy surroundings, and whether she or he works in unhealthy physical
positions or works night shifts. These control variables are likely to strongly correlate
with a person’s job satisfaction, and our results bear out this assumption. Descriptive
statistics on all the variables appear in the appendix.
5Apprenticeship training in Germany combines on-the-job training and formal education.
Around 60 percent of each cohort choose apprenticeship training. In contrast, university grad-
uates compose about 20 percent, a small percentage in comparison to other Western countries.
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4.3 Estimation strategy
This section presents our estimation strategy. A number of studies such as Clark and
Oswald (1996), consider job satisfaction as a type of sub-utility function u representing
utility from working in an overall utility function v = v(u,µ), where µ is utility from other
areas of life. The utility from working is usually considered to be of the form:
ui = ui(w,h, i, j) (4.2)
where w is income, h is hours of work, and i and j are sets of individual and job-specific
characteristics. We extend this utility function by a parameter P, which represents the
occupational specific stereotypes of an individual’s job.
ui = ui(w,h, i, j,P) (4.3)
Therefore, equation (4.2) gives us a natural starting point for applying the following
regression equation:
JS∗i = β0 +β1Pi +β2wi +β3hi +X
′
i γ+ εi (4.4)
JS∗i is a latent variable that indicates the job satisfaction of individual i. Pi represents
our index for gender stereotypes. Bigger values of Pi that are closer to a value of 4 indicate
stereotypically male jobs, and lower values of Pi that are closer to a value of 0 indicate
stereotypically female jobs. wi refers to an individual’s monthly income, and hi represents
the weekly working hours. Xi contains a broad set of control variables for personal and
job characteristics. Our coefficient of main interest is β1, which measures the effect of
being in a stereotypically male job. We estimate equation (4.4) separately for males and
females. A positive value of β1 indicates that females or males report higher satisfaction
values for stereotypically male jobs. A negative value of β1 indicates that females or
males report lower satisfaction values for stereotypically male jobs.
As JS∗i is not observable, we follow the literature by assuming the following relation-
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ship:
JSi =

1 if JSi∗i < α1
2 if α1 ≤ JSi∗i < α2
3 if α2 ≤ JSi∗i < α3
4 if α3 ≤ JSi∗i
JSi is a 4-point Lickert scale index that indicates the satisfaction of individual i, and
αi represents cut parameters which we then estimate. As εi is assumed to be normally
distributed, we apply an ordered probit model.
Thus far equation (4.4) does not take into account that individuals are not randomly
assigned to their jobs but instead choose them according to their preferences, their abili-
ties, and their employer’s hiring decisions. Individuals who perform jobs associated with
stereotypes of the opposite gender are either likely to favor those jobs or are able to deal
with the potential negative consequences arising from gender-specific stereotyping. Thus
β1 is likely to underestimate the true average effect of occupational stereotypes on the
individual’s job satisfaction. We handle this problem by using an instrumental variable
approach. We estimate the following equation in the first stage.
Pi = δ0 +δ1Zi +X ′iϕ+ui (4.5)
Equation (4.5) models the self-selection alongside the ordered probit model. Again,
Pi is the index for occupational stereotypes. Xi contains the same set of variables such as
in (4.4). Zi is a instrumental variable that we assume to be correlated with Pi but not with
εi.
As an instrument we use the mean of Pi calculated at the state level of the individuals
residence. The logic is as follows: If an individual happens to live in a state with a high
percentage of stereotypically male jobs, she or he is more likely to choose a stereotypi-
cally male job, In particularly because individuals in Germany are much less mobile than
in the U.S. and often choose a job in their region of residence. Consequently for most
individuals the region of residence is given by their region of birth and can be considered
as exogenously given for most individuals. However, the percentage of stereotypically
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male jobs in an individual’s region should not directly affect the individuals job satisfac-
tion. German states have a high variation in their industry and urbanization. Some states
constitute only a large city such as Berlin, where urbanization is quite high and where ser-
vice jobs, which are usually considered stereotypically female, predominate. Other states
cover several cities and larger regions, where the agricultural sector and industries such
as coal mining, which are more likely to be perceived as stereotypically male, predomi-
nate. For the purpose of our study we calculate the mean of Pi in each state separately for
women and men.
We are aware that such an instrument does not mimic a fully exogenous randomization
of an individual’s job choice. Instead, our instrument rather identifies a restriction in job
choices for a particular sub-population. Therefore, we are able to identify only a local
average treatment (LATE) for a particular sub population (Imbens and Angrist; 1994).
Finding an instrument or a natural experiment that identifies a true randomization for an
individuals job choice is practically impossible for the data at hand. However, we argue
that the LATE offers important insights still as we are able to identify a sub-population of
individuals who did not choose their jobs according to their preferences but rather because
the job was available within the individual’s region. Such individuals are far less likely
to choose their jobs because they have extensive preferences for stereotypically female or
male jobs6.
We estimate our regression in a two-stage procedure similar to the two-stage condi-
tional maximum likelihood approach proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988). First, we
obtain uˆi = Pi−Z′i δˆ from equation (4.5). Second, we estimate the following regression
with an ordered probit model.
JS∗i = β0 +β1Pi +β2wi +β3hi +X
′
i γ+θuˆi + εi (4.6)
Equation (4.6) is similar to equation (4.4) but additionally contains the regressors uˆi.
θ is referred to as the additional coefficient of uˆi. A useful feature of this procedure is
6There is extensive discussion in the literature about the use and interpretation of the LATE
(Imbens; 2010).
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that the z-statistics of θ serves as a test for the exogeneiety of Pi. The null hypothesis that
Pi is exogenous has to be rejected if θ 6= 0. However, obtaining the standard errors from
such a procedure directly leads to misleading conclusions, as the naive standard errors do
not take into account that the first stage is estimated with bias. Thus we adjust the errors
according to Murphy and Topel (1985), who derive the standard errors for an IV probit
estimator with a continuous endogenous regressor. We extend their approach to an IV
ordered probit regression with a continuous endogenous regressor.
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4.4 Results
This section presents the regression results in detail, first giving the descriptive statistics,
and, second the results for the ordered probit regression. Third, we present the results of
our 2SCML IV approach, and fourth, we present some robustness checks.
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.4 provides some descriptives statistics for Pi, our index for occupational stereo-
types, to determine how occupational stereotypes are distributed across the observed pop-
ulation. If Pi is closer to 4, the value indicates that the job is associated with a more male
stereotype. If Pi is closer to 0, then the job is associated with a more female stereotype.
The first row of the table shows an average of Pi for men of about 2.40 and a variance of
about 0.38. For women the respective values are 2.03 and 0.26. Thus the results show that
men work significantly more often in stereotypically male jobs and indicate a tendency of
occupational segregation along the lines of occupational stereotypes. But the variance of
Pi is bigger for men than for women, meaning that men work in a broader range of jobs
than women.
Table 4.4: Index: Stereotype P
Gender: Mean Std. Dev.
Women 2.03 0.26
Men 2.41 0.38
Education: Mean Std. Dev.
Low 2.25 0.38
Middle 2.30 0.40
High 2.11 0.27
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
Predicted values from an OLS regression of occ. sex stereotypes on tasks.
The second part of the table shows the means and standard deviations for the three
educational groups. For all three groups we find a mean slightly above 2. For university
graduates the table shows the lowest mean of about 2.11 and the smallest standard devi-
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ation of about 0.27. The tendency towards stereotypically male jobs is most pronounced
among apprenticeship graduates, who account for the biggest percentage of the German
work force. However, apprenticeship graduates also have the biggest variance for occu-
pational stereotypes. Such a result is not surprising because apprenticeship graduates are
most likely to hold a broad range of jobs. The apprenticeship degree qualifies its recipi-
ents for stereotypically female jobs such as service jobs and for stereotypically male jobs
such as blue-collar jobs.
Table 4.5 and 4.6 show means and standard deviations of our index for occupational
stereotypes Pi by satisfaction levels for women and men. Table 4.5 shows the results for
women. Those women who are very unsatisfied with their jobs are most likely to work
in stereotype male jobs—i.e. the value of Pi is with 2.7 highest for women who are very
unsatisfied with their jobs. The table shows a similar result for satisfaction with work
climate and satisfaction of tasks. The average of Pi is 2.06 for women who are very
unsatisfied with their work climate and 2.08 for women who are very unsatisfied with
the contents of their tasks. The only exception is income satisfaction, where the mean
of Pi is with 2.05. Thus the pure descriptive results indicate that women who work in
stereotypically male jobs are more satisfied with their income but less satisfied with their
overall satisfaction, with their work climate and their contents of tasks.
Table 4.5: Stereotypes by satisfaction categories: women
Satisfaction dimension Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Very unsatisfied 2.07 2.06 2.08 1.98
Unsatisfied 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.02
Satisfied 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.04
Very satisfied 2.03 2.02 2.02 2.05
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
Columns contain means of Pi for each satisfaction category.
Table 4.6 shows the results for men. The evidence for men does not show such a clear
picture. We find a tendency that men who report lower values for overall satisfaction,
satisfaction with tasks, and satisfaction with income are more likely to work in stereotyp-
ically male jobs. Only men who report being very satisfied with their work climate work
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are slightly more often in stereotypically male jobs.
Table 4.6: Stereotypes by satisfaction categories: men
Satisfaction dimension Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Very unsatisfied 2.37 2.38 2.44 2.39
Unsatisfied 2.44 2.39 2.43 2.43
Satisfied 2.42 2.41 2.43 2.41
Very satisfied 2.36 2.41 2.36 2.38
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
Columns contain means of Pi for each satisfaction category.
4.4.2 Ordered probit estimates
Table 4.7 provides the estimates of equation (4.4)—the simple ordered probit regression of
the relation between stereotypes and job satisfaction for women and men. The dependent
variables are our four satisfaction measures: overall job satisfaction, satisfaction with
work climate, satisfaction with the contents of tasks, and satisfaction with income. Our
main variable of interest is Pi, our index for gender-specific stereotypes. A positive value
of β1 indicates that the probability of being in the highest satisfaction category rises while
the probability of being in the lowest category decreases.
Table 4.7 presents the estimates for women, with additional controls typically in-
cluded in studies on job satisfaction. Before we discuss the effect of occupational stereo-
types, we show that the control variables yield results in line with previous literature.
Income has a positive significant effect on overall job satisfaction, satisfaction with the
contents of tasks, and income satisfaction. This result is in line with the literature on job
satisfaction (Clark and Oswald; 1996; Clark; 1997; Frijters et al.; 2004). In contrast, the
satisfaction with work climate decreases for women with a higher income. As more com-
petitive environments are likely to yield higher income, this result is in line with recent
findings that women face disadvantages under strong competition (Gneezy et al.; 2003).
Job satisfaction decreases with age at a decreasing rate. The coefficients on age and age-
squared show the typical U-shaped pattern found in the former literature. However, the
coefficients are not significant at the 10 percent level. Weekly working hours shows the
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typical negative effect on job satisfaction. In contrast to some previous findings, indi-
viduals with higher education report higher job satisfaction values. Nevertheless, other
studies such as Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) find the same positive significant effect
for education.
Table 4.7: Job satisfaction and occupational stereotypes: women
Dependent variables: Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Index: Stereotypes P -0.047 -0.127** -0.209*** 0.241***
(0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053)
Ref.: Low education
Medium education 0.255*** 0.147*** 0.325*** 0.056*
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
High education 0.290*** 0.116** 0.449*** -0.006
(0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047)
Age in years -1.070 -0.635 0.351 -0.329
(0.861) (0.841) (0.834) (0.836)
Age squared 1.450 0.407 -0.167 1.026
(1.038) (1.020) (1.008) (1.011)
Monthly income/100 0.013*** -0.003* 0.012*** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Weekly working hours -0.008*** -0.004** -0.001 -0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N 7336 7336 7336 7336
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
The dependent variables are 4-point Lickert scales on 4 job satisfaction dimensions.
Robust standard errors are used. Standard errors under coefficients.
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
The effect of main interest is the indicator for occupational stereotypes. The sign
of Pi is negative for overall satisfaction, satisfaction with work climate and satisfaction
with contents of tasks. For satisfaction with income the effect is positive, even if we
control for monthly income. While for overall satisfaction the effect is not significant at
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the 10 percent level, we find well-defined effects with small standard errors for the other
satisfaction categories. Therefore, our results support the descriptive statistics section 3.1
As our index does not provide a natural way of interpreting the effect in terms of
marginal effects, we show predicted probabilities for two sample jobs. The first job F is
stereotypically female and the second job M is stereotypically male. The stereotypically
female job F contains the following tasks: preparing food, serving and accommodating,
cleaning, disposing of garbage, buying and selling, writing, teaching, and care-taking.
According to our index job F, has a value of Pi = 0.95. The stereotypically male job M
contains the following tasks: repairing, driving, and working on buildings. M has an index
value of about Pi = 3.5. We hold all other control variables constant at the mean.
Table 4.8 provides the predicted probabilities for being very satisfied for both jobs.
We estimate for the stereotypically female job F a probability of about 34 percent of be-
ing very satisfied for overall job satisfaction. A women who performs the stereotypically
male job has only a 29 percent probabilty of being very satisfied overall. This amounts
to a 4 percent decrease in the probability of being very satisfied with overall satisfaction.
For the satisfaction with work climate the decrease is 12 per cent and for satisfaction with
the contents of tasks the decrease is 18 per cent. Thus for both categories the decrease
is even bigger than for overall satisfaction. Only for the satisfaction with income does
the effect go in the opposite direction and we estimate a 12 percent increase in the prob-
ability of a woman being very satisfied in the stereotypically male job rather than in the
stereotypically female job.
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Table 4.8: Predicted probability of being very satisfied: women I
Dependent variables: Overall Work climate Tasks Income
without add. controlsa
Stereotypically female job (F): 0.34 0.43** 0.39*** 0.07***
Stereotypically male job (M): 0.29 0.31 0.21 0.19
with add. controlsb
Stereotypically female job (F): 0.32 0.43* 0.37** 0.07***
Stereotypically male job (M): 0.32 0.32 0.23 0.19
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
The dependent variables are 4-point Lickert scales on 4 job satisfaction dimensions.
Predictions stem from regressions of Table 7 and 9
a Contains Education, age, income and working hours as controls.
b Contains a and dummies for heavy weight, smoke, dust noise, cold and night shift as controls.
* Difference to male job significant at 10 percent level.
** Difference to male job significant at 5 percent level.
***Difference to male job significant at 1 percent level.
One argument that our results are not caused by gender stereotyping is that male jobs
are characterized by challenging physical working conditions (e.g. heavy lifting) that
have a strong effect on women’s job satisfaction. In other words, the negative effect of
performing a stereotypically male job might arise only because women find such work-
ing conditions unpleasant. Fortunately, we have detailed information on such working
conditions and can control for those influences. Table 4.9 presents the results for the coef-
ficients and shows no major differences with respect to sign and significance level. Table
4.8 shows the predicted probabilities of being very satisfied. The differences between the
stereotypically female and the stereotypically male job vanish for overall satisfaction. For
satisfaction with work climate, we estimate a 12 percent gap; for satisfaction with con-
tents of tasks, we estimate a 14 percent gap; and for income satisfaction, we estimate a
12 per cent gap. As the results remain quite stable when we include controls for unpleas-
ant work characteristics, we conclude that those characteristics are not driving our results
substantially.
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Table 4.9: Job satisfaction and occupational stereotypes: women II
Dependent variables: Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Index: Stereotypes P -0.003 -0.101* -0.149*** 0.243***
(0.054) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054)
Ref.: Low education
Medium education 0.215*** 0.114*** 0.289*** 0.028
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
High education 0.268*** 0.097** 0.429*** -0.022
(0.049) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047)
Age in years -0.873 -0.483 0.510 -0.160
(0.867) (0.844) (0.834) (0.838)
Age squared 1.175 0.181 -0.390 0.800
(1.047) (1.024) (1.009) (1.012)
Monthly income/100 0.012*** -0.004*** 0.011*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Weekly working hours -0.006*** -0.002 0.001 -0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Heavy weight -0.097** -0.089* 0.002 -0.237***
(0.047) (0.045) (0.044) (0.046)
Smoke, dust, etc. -0.257*** -0.186*** -0.268*** -0.129***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Night-/shiftwork -0.159*** -0.163*** -0.135*** -0.084**
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
N 7336 7336 7336 7336
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
The dependent variables are 4 point lickert scales on 4 job satisfaction dimensions.
Robust standard errors are used. Standard errors under coefficients.
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
Unfortunately, we do not know how many men work with the observed women. Thus
determining whether the effect stems from stereotyping or from the possibility that women
do not like to work with men, even in a female job is difficult. We try to overcome this
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problem by estimating the share of men for each individual’s job. In particular we estimate
a linear probability model with a gender dummy as dependent variable and the tasks as
explanatory variables. We then incorporate the predicted values from that regression into
equation (4.4) as an additional control variable.
Table 4.10 presents the results for women. It shows negative coefficient values for
Pi with respect to overall satisfaction, satisfaction with work climate, and satisfaction
with contents of tasks. It also shows a positive effect for income satisfaction. The effect
is statistically significant for overall satisfaction and satisfaction with contents of tasks.
For work climate we estimate a very similar coefficient value as in Table 4.9, but the
standard errors become somewhat bigger. The newly incorporated variable “percentage
of males” is positive significant for overall satisfaction, satisfaction with contents of tasks,
and income satisfaction. The effect is negative but not significant for the satisfaction with
work climate. Therefore, these results confirm, at least qualitatively, the results in Table
4.9 . However, we are aware that multicollinearity might bias the results of Table 4.10 and
even turn the coefficient signs in the wrong direction, as Pi and the estimated percentage
of males within each job are highly correlated—the correlation of both variables is about
0.81. Therefore, we emphasize that the results in Table 4.10 must be carefully interpreted.
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Table 4.10: Job satisfaction and occupational stereotypes: women III
Dependent variables: Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Index: Stereotypes P -0.364*** -0.101 -0.660*** 0.051
(0.090) (0.088) (0.090) (0.092)
Percentage of males 0.537*** -0.001 0.757*** 0.285***
(0.108) (0.106) (0.108) (0.106)
Ref.: Low education
Medium education 0.209*** 0.114*** 0.280*** 0.025
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
High education 0.237*** 0.098** 0.386*** -0.039
(0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.047)
Age in years -1.033 -0.483 0.290 -0.248
(0.873) (0.845) (0.840) (0.838)
Age squared 1.413 0.181 -0.060 0.932
(1.055) (1.026) (1.017) (1.013)
Monthly income/100 0.010*** -0.004** 0.008*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Weekly working hours -0.006*** -0.002 0.002 -0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Heavy weight -0.089* -0.089* 0.014 -0.233***
(0.047) (0.045) (0.044) (0.046)
Smoke, dust, noise, etc. -0.267*** -0.186*** -0.283*** -0.135***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Night-/shiftwork -0.136*** -0.164*** -0.104*** -0.073*
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
N 7336 7336 7336 7336
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
The dependent variables are 4-point Lickert scales on 4 job satisfaction dimensions.
Robust standard errors are used. Standard errors under coefficients.
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
Table 4.11 presents the first ordered probit results for men. As we did with women,
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we look first at the control variables, finding three main differences between the results
for men and women. First, age enters the regression as highly significant negative for
satisfaction with work climate, the contents of tasks, and income satisfaction. Thus older
men seem to report lower satisfaction values than younger men. This result contradicts the
result for the women were age does not enter the regressions significantly. Second, income
shows a positive effect on all satisfaction measures, including work climate. The result
contradicts our previous findings for women who are less satisfied with their work climate
if they earn more. However, the result is in line with former evidence showing that men
suffer less from competition, which is more likely to occur in well-paid positions. Third,
the weekly working hours show no effect or a positive significant effect on satisfaction
with the contents of tasks. Such a result might occur because men on average do not
differ substantially in their working hours. Men might also put less value on work-time
flexibility and therefore remain unaffected by long working hours.
The effect of the main variable of interest Pi shows a more heterogeneous picture than
in the case of women. We find a negative significant effect on overall satisfaction and
no statistical significant effect for satisfaction with work climate or the contents of tasks.
However, in line with the women’s results, the effect is positive and significant for income
satisfaction. Thus far, the multivariate estimates mimic the descriptive results.
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Table 4.11: Job satisfaction and occupational stereotypes: men I
Dependent variables: Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Index: Stereotypes P -0.094*** 0.041 -0.048 0.116***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Ref.: Low education
Medium education 0.249*** 0.081*** 0.295*** 0.054*
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
High education 0.276*** 0.051 0.346*** -0.042
(0.043) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042)
Age in years -1.089 -3.269*** -1.475** -2.436***
(0.754) (0.723) (0.748) (0.733)
Age squared 1.245 3.527*** 1.817** 3.241***
(0.880) (0.843) (0.870) (0.853)
Monthly income/100 0.013*** 0.002* 0.015*** 0.025***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Weekly working hours 0.001 -0.000 0.006*** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N 11660 11660 11660 11660
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
The dependent variables are 4-point Lickert scales on 4 job satisfaction dimensions.
Robust standard errors are used. Standard errors under coefficients.
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
Table 4.12 reports the predicted probabilities for men holding the sample stereotyp-
ically female job F and for men holding the stereotypically male job M. For men we
estimate an 8 percent decrease for overall satisfaction when switching from the female
job F to the male job M. We estimate a 3 percent increase for satisfaction with work cli-
mate, a 4 percent decrease for satisfaction with contents of tasks, and a 6 percent increase
for income satisfaction. Thus our results show an even bigger negative effect of Pi on
men’s overall satisfaction than on women’s. However, the negative effect for the satisfac-
tion with contents of tasks is much bigger for women and the effect on work climate is
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even positive, although insignificant.
Table 4.12: Predicted probability of being very satisfied: men
Dependent variables: Overall Work climate Tasks Income
without add. controlsa
Stereotypically female job (F): 0.34** 0.31 0.32 0.09***
Stereotypically male job (M): 0.26 0.34 0.28 0.15
with add. controlsb
Stereotypically female job (F): 0.26** 0.25*** 0.25** 0.07***
Stereotypically male job (M): 0.33 0.40 0.33 0.17
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
Predictions stem from regressions of Table 11 and 13.
The dependent variables are 4-point Lickert scales on 4 job satisfaction dimensions.
a Contains Education, age, income and working hours as controls.
b Contains a and dummies for heavy weight, smoke, dust noise, cold and night shift as controls.
* Difference to male job significant at 10 percent level.
** Difference to male job significant at 5 percent level.
***Difference to male job significant at 1 percent level.
Table 4.13 adds further controls for unpleasant working conditions for men. In con-
trast to the women’s results, those for men change substantially when we include the
variables for unpleasant working conditions. All coefficients turn positive and highly sig-
nificant. As we show in Table 4.12, the now positive effects are substantial. For overall
satisfaction, we estimate a 6 percentage increase. For satisfaction with work climate, we
estimate a 14 percent increase. For satisfaction with contents of tasks, we estimate an 8
percent increase, and for income satisfaction we estimate a 10 percent increase. In contrast
to the estimation results for women the results for men are strongly driven by unpleasant
working conditions, and when we control for such conditions, men report even higher
satisfaction values in stereotypically male jobs than in stereotypically female jobs. This
result strongly supports that stereotypes might indeed influence the satisfaction of male
workers. In other words, men suffer from the unpleasant working conditions in male jobs
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but as soon as we control these factors male workers appear to be more satisfied when
working in a male job.
Table 4.13: Job satisfaction and occupational stereotypes: men II
Dependent variables: Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Index: Stereotypes P 0.074** 0.156*** 0.089** 0.223***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Ref.: Low education
Medium education 0.228*** 0.061** 0.270*** 0.044
(0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031)
High education 0.210*** -0.003 0.282*** -0.075*
(0.044) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042)
Age in years -0.790 -2.988*** -1.138 -2.383***
(0.755) (0.726) (0.750) (0.734)
Age squared 0.892 3.193*** 1.413 3.178***
(0.882) (0.847) (0.873) (0.853)
Monthly income/100 0.011*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Weekly working hours 0.002 0.001 0.008*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Heavy weight -0.079*** -0.031 -0.080*** -0.149***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Smoke, dust, etc. -0.212*** -0.149*** -0.145*** -0.075***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
Night-/shiftwork -0.129*** -0.149*** -0.192*** 0.006
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
N 11660 11660 11660 11660
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
The dependent variables are 4-point Lickert scales on 4 job satisfaction dimensions.
Robust standard errors are used. Standard errors under coefficients.
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
In Table 4.14 we additionally control for the estimated percentage of males. When we
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control for percentage of males the coefficients of Pi turn negative significant for overall
satisfaction and satisfaction with contents of tasks and remains positive significant for
the satisfaction with work climate. The effect remains positive significant for income
satisfaction. Apart for the satisfaction with work climate, the coefficients for the estimated
percentage of males enters every regression positive and significant. For satisfaction with
work climate the coefficient is negative but not significant. Thus Table 4.14 supports our
argumentation that stereotypes drive the results and not necessarily the fact that men are
working with other men. Again, we report these estimates with caution because of the
multicolinearity problem that we previously mentioned.
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Table 4.14: Job satisfaction and occupational stereotypes: men III
Dependent variables: Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Index: Stereotypes P 0.009 0.190*** -0.115** 0.284***
(0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
Share of males 0.131 -0.070 0.413*** -0.123
Ref.: Low education
(0.083) (0.078) (0.082) (0.079)
Medium education 0.226*** 0.062** 0.264*** 0.046
(0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031)
High education 0.206*** -0.001 0.268*** -0.071*
(0.044) (0.041) (0.044) (0.043)
Age in years -0.821 -2.973*** -1.237* -2.357***
(0.755) (0.726) (0.750) (0.734)
Age squared 0.938 3.170*** 1.557* 3.138***
(0.882) (0.847) (0.872) (0.854)
Monthly income/100 0.011*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.025***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Weekly working hours 0.002 0.001 0.007*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Heavy weight -0.076*** -0.033 -0.071** -0.152***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Smoke, dust, etc. -0.215*** -0.148*** -0.153*** -0.073***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
Night-/shiftwork -0.128*** -0.150*** -0.188*** 0.005
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
N 11660 11660 11660 11660
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
The dependent variables are 4-point Lickert scales on 4 job satisfaction dimensions.
Robust standard errors are used. Standard errors under coefficients.
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
104
Chapter 4: Occupational stereotypes, gender segregation and job satisfaction
4.4.3 2SCML estimates
One of our greatest concerns with the results thus far is that we implicitly assume that
the job choice of an individual is exogenous. Such an assumption is far from reality, as
individuals choose their jobs as a result of their tastes or abilities or the hiring decisions
of employers. In our case, it is particularly likely that people who decide to perform a job
related to stereotypes of the opposite gender can cope far better with the negative effects
that arise from stereotyping than can individuals who refuse to perform such a job. As a
result, we cannot assume that Pi is an exogenous regressor in equation (4.4).
For this reason we apply a IV regression as described in equation (4.6). Table 4.15
provides the results for women. At the bottom of the table we report the z-statistics
of θ, which indicate whether Pi is endogenous or not. The z-value is 1.57 for overall
satisfaction, 3.00 for satisfaction with work climate, 1.90 for satisfaction with contents
of tasks, and 0.93 for income satisfaction. We have to reject the hypothesis of Pi being
endogenous for the estimates for satisfaction with work climate and contents of tasks.
Only with respect to overall satisfaction and income satisfaction do we not find that θ is
significant at the 10 percent level. However, the z-value is quite close to the critical value
of 10 percent for overall satisfaction.
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Table 4.15: Job satisfaction and occupational stereotypes: women (2SCML)
Dependent variables: Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Index: Stereotypes P -2.308 -4.492* -2.979 -1.08
(1.985) (2.31) (2.076) (1.5)
Coef. Instrument 0.863** 0.863** 0.863** 0.863**
(0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287)
z-statistic: θ 1.57 3.00 1.90 0.93
F-statistic: first stage 9.04 9.04 9.04 9.04
N 7336 7336 7336 7336
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
The dependent variables are 4-point Lickert scales on 4 job satisfaction dimensions.
Adjusted standard errors are used. Standard errors under coefficients.
Further controls are education, age, monthly income, working hours
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
In addition, we report the first stage coefficient of our instrument and the first stage F-
value at the bottom of the table. The coefficient of the first stage is positive, indicating that
women who live in a region with more stereotypically male jobs are significantly more
likely to choose a stereotypically male job. The first stage F-value is about 9.04. Staiger
and Stock (1997) propose an F-value of 10 as rule of thumb for avoiding problems of
weak instruments. Our F-value of 9.04 is only slightly below 10. The first row of the
table provides the estimates of Pi. The estimation results show the same signs that we
obtained in the classical ordered probit estimation of Table 4.7, but the coefficients and
standard errors blow up as we estimate Pi with less precision. The only coefficient that
remains significant at the 10 percent level is the negative effect on satisfaction with work
climate.
Table 4.16 reports the results for men. The z-statistics for θ are 4.17 for overall
satisfaction, 2.95 for satisfaction with work climate, 1.81 for satisfaction with contents
of tasks and 1.52 for income satisfaction. All values—apart from income satisfaction—
indicate that we have to reject the hypothesis that Pi is exogenous under the assumption
that our instrument is valid. Moreover, our instruments show the expected direction and
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our F-statistic is about 13.23—a value above 10. In contrast to the estimates in Table 4.11
where the effect was negative for overall satisfaction and the satisfaction with contents of
tasks, all coefficient values of Pi are positive. However, as for women, the effect remains
significant only for satisfaction with work climate.
Table 4.16: Job satisfaction and occupational stereotypes: men (2SCML)
Dependent variables: Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Index: Stereotypes P 3.732 2.64** 1.595 1.475
(2.51) (1.301) (1.274) (1.006)
Coef. Instrument 0.737*** 0.737*** 0.737*** 0.737***
(0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203)
z-statistic: θ 4.17 2.95 1.81 1.52
F-statistic: first stage 13.23 13.23 13.23 13.23
N 11660 11660 11660 11660
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
The dependent variables are 4-point Lickert scales on 4 job satisfaction dimensions.
Adjusted standard errors are used. Standard errors under coefficients.
Further controls are education, age, monthly income, working hours
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
As previously mentioned, our instrumental variable estimation allows us to identify
only the LATE for a sub-population of individuals restricted in their job choices because
of the industrial structure within their region. We argue that these individuals are less
likely to be in their jobs because they particularly favor stereotypically female or male
jobs and that they did not choose their jobs because they were especially well prepared to
cope with the possible negative effects of gender-specific stereotypes.
4.4.4 Sensitivity analysis
This section provides a sensitivity analysis for different sub-populations of our sample.
As already mentioned, the biggest concern in estimating the effect of occupational stereo-
types on job satisfaction is that individuals in different jobs are likely to have different
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characteristics and hold their jobs for different reasons. As a result, occupational stereo-
types have different effects on individuals in different jobs. As it is nearly impossible
to find an instrument or a natural experiment that induces a random assignment of indi-
viduals into their jobs, this section provides a sensitivity analysis in which we examine
different sub-samples for which we have information about the individual’s job choices.
In particular, our data set contains information about individuals who changed their jobs
and about the reasons for their job changes.
Tables 4.17 and 4.18 present results for two groups of individuals. The first group
contains individuals who changed their jobs to earn more, to perform more interesting
tasks, or to have more personal responsibilities. The second group of individuals contains
individuals who were displaced or laid off from their old jobs or who suffered health
problems and remain at their former jobs. Both groups have their jobs for very different
reasons: The first group contains voluntary movers, who are likely to have considered
the effects of occupational stereotypes before the job change yet still chosen the job they
hold. The second group holds their jobs because they were forced to take that job by
an exogenous event. Both groups of individuals are likely to experience the negative or
positive effects of stereotyping in fairly different ways. The first group chooses their jobs
to improve their working situation and to have a better job. The second group experienced
a negative shock and had to change their jobs invuoluntary.
Table 4.17 presents the results for women. The first part presents the results for the
voluntary and involuntary movers without controls for unpleasant working conditions.
The second part presents the results with such controls. Without controls for unpleasant
working conditions, the results for voluntary movers mimic the results for women in Table
4.7, with the negative effect of Pi on overall satisfaction now even significant. When we
now control for unpleasant working conditions, the effects become insignificant, apart
from the effect for income satisfaction. For women who changed jobs involuntarily, we
find positive effects for all specifications—a sharp contrast to the former results. Maybe
those women who lost their job and manage to end up in a higher paid male job are more
satisfied than those women ending up in a lower paid male job. However, no effect is
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significantly different from zero, and the sample size is only around 400. The effects are
similar whether we control for unpleasant working conditions or not.
Table 4.18 presents the results for men. For voluntary movers and without controls
for unpleasant working conditions, we find a negative insignificant effect of Pi on overall
satisfaction, a positive but insignificant effect on satisfaction with work climate, a negative
significant effect on satisfaction with contents of tasks and a positive significant effect
for income satisfaction. If we control for unpleasant working conditions most of the
effects—apart from satisfaction with income—turn positive: significant for satisfaction
with work climate and income but insignificant for the other two satisfaction categories.
For involuntary movers we find no significant effect, and the effect of Pi on work climate
is now negative. The effects for the first group of voluntary movers are similar to those
in Table 4.11 and Table 4.13. Such as it is the case for women we find no significant
effects for involuntary movers and the coefficient signs differ from the former results.
One possible explanation is that the negative shock decreased the satisfaction level for all
workers to a very low level and does not differ much irrespective of whether the individual
is in a stereotype male or female job. Yet we have to interpret the effects with caution as
the sample size is rather small.
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Table 4.17: Job satisfaction and occupational stereotypes: women (job movers)
Voluntary movers
Dependent variables: Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Without controls
Index: Stereotypes P -0.273** -0.223* -0.370*** 0.129
(0.135) (0.134) (0.137) (0.141)
With controls
Index: Stereotypes P -0.060 -0.065 -0.118 0.233
(0.146) (0.150) (0.144) (0.148)
Observations: 883 883 883 883
Involuntary movers:
Dependent variables: Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Without controls
Index: Stereotypes P 0.195 0.039 0.147 0.220
(0.205) (0.188) (0.188) (0.205)
With controls
Index: Stereotypes P 0.234 0.080 0.188 0.233
(0.209) (0.190) (0.193) (0.209)
Observations: 480 480 480 480
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
The dependent variables are 4-point Lickert scales on 4 job satisfaction dimensions.
Robust standard errors are used. Standard errors under coefficients.
Regression includes all control variables.
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
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Table 4.18: Job satisfaction and occupational stereotypes: women (job movers)
Voluntary movers
Dependent variables: Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Without controls
Index: Stereotypes P -0.072 0.038 -0.189** 0.211***
(0.075) (0.071) (0.076) (0.072)
With controls
Index: Stereotypes P 0.114 0.145* -0.040 0.277***
(0.081) (0.077) (0.084) (0.079)
Observations: 2343 2343 2343 2343
Involuntary movers:
Dependent variables: Overall Work climate Tasks Income
Without controls
Index: Stereotypes P -0.063 -0.108 0.100 0.132
(0.120) (0.120) (0.122) (0.114)
With controls
Index: Stereotypes P 0.024 -0.053 0.177 0.185
(0.130) (0.129) (0.133) (0.123)
Observations: 882 882 882 882
Note: All data are drawn from the BIBB/IAB Strukturerhebung 1991/92.
The dependent variables are 4-point Lickert scales on 4 job satisfaction dimensions.
Robust standard errors are used. Standard errors under coefficients.
Regression includes all control variables.
* Denotes significant at 10 percent level.
** Denotes significant at 5 percent level.
*** Denotes significant at 1 percent level.
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4.5 Conclusion
This paper has provided evidence of an empirical relation between occupational stereo-
types and job satisfaction. Women appear less satisfied in stereotypically male occupa-
tions than in stereotypically female occupations. This disparity in satisfaction is most
pronounced for satisfaction with work climate and satisfaction with the contents of tasks.
In contrast, income satisfaction is higher for women in stereotypically male jobs. Mean-
while, men report higher satisfaction values in stereotypically male jobs, in particular with
respect to their work climate.
Even if stereotyping is persistent in the labor market and affects the subjective well-
being of individuals, classical economic theory does not provide a direct link between oc-
cupational stereotypes and job satisfaction. However, as we mentioned in the introduction
a recent influential literature incorporating the concept of identity into an economic frame-
work hypothesizes a structural relationship between utility payoffs and different kinds of
jobs. Akerlof and Kranton (2000)7 state that individuals are assigned to different social
categories and that these social categories are associated with different attributes and pre-
scribed behaviors. If individuals violate these behaviors, they could suffer identity losses.
In contrast, if they behave in line with the prescriptions of their social category, they might
gain utility.
As our results show, occupations and tasks are also associated with social gender
categories indicating either male or female attributes or behavior, and thus follow such
categorical prescriptions. In particular we show that jobs containing tasks such as driving
vehicles, maintaining machines, or doing calculations and bookkeeping are more likely to
be considered inappropriate for women, whereas tasks such as cleaning, care-giving, or
teaching are considered more appropriate for women.
Moreover, the paper shows that occupational stereotypes affect different dimensions
of job satisfaction for women and men in different ways. We show that women are less
satisfied with their work climate and contents of tasks but are more satisfied with their
7The theory of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) is not independent of earlier theories on discrimi-
nation, especially by co-workers, such as by Becker (1971).
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income in stereotypically male jobs. As these results hold even when we control for
working hours, unpleasant working conditions, and income (as well as for different sub-
populations), we argue that the negative relationship between job satisfaction and stereo-
typically male jobs cannot be exclusively explained by women favoring different bundles
of work characteristics than men—an explanation brought up by Bender et al. (2005) to
explain the gender wage gap. Likewise the theory of Clark (1997) about differences in
expectations might not fully explain why women are less satisfied with their work climate
in stereotypically male jobs and men are more satisfied with their work climate in stereo-
typically male jobs. Especially because it is not likely that women (men) have high expec-
tations of a good work climate in male (female) jobs which are disappointed afterwards.
Nevertheless, the negative effect of male occupational stereotypes on women’s satisfac-
tion with their work climate is robust for a variety of empirical specification, whereas men
are more satisfied with their work climate in stereotypically male jobs. We argue that such
a relationship is rather in line with Akerlof and Kranton (2000), who argue that deviating
from one’s social category affects not only one’s own sense of self but also the identity of
others nearby. Therefore, their theory suggests that women and men should have different
feeling about their work climate within stereotypically male or female jobs.
As our results suggest that factors such as prejudice and gender-specific stereotypes
affect the utility outcomes of women and men, we argue that social influences other than
income and other observable job characteristics (such as, for example, working hours),
are very likely to affect individual’s choice of a job. Such social influences, however, are
very difficult for policy makers to change and might explain the persistence of gender job
segregation in Western countries. Moreover, social occupational stereotypes might induce
inefficient allocations of workers to jobs and might induce welfare losses.
One potential remedy to overcome the negative consequences of gender specific
stereotypes in the labor market might be to introduce quotas for female workers in the
occupations. Such quotas might help to reduce such stereotypes as it might be easier for
women to integrate in the work process if they have more female colleges.
To sum op throughout this dissertation we have shown that the task-based view helps
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us to understand a great variety of labor market outcomes. Therefore, the last section
summarizes all results, provides policy implications and gives ideas for further research.
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Final Remarks
In an effort to better understand the link between technology and labor demand, recent
literature has adopted a task-based view of technological change. The major feature of
this framework is conceptualizing work as a series of tasks. However, the relationship
between the task-based view and individual careers and labor market outcomes has been
less clearly pronounced. This dissertation shows in a series of empirical investigations
that the tasks-based view explains different phenomena in the labor market, such as hu-
man capital depreciation, gender-specific job choices, or varying income losses after job
displacement.
The first research question of this dissertation is whether the task-based view is able
to explain why different types of human capital suffer from depreciation in different ways.
Therefore, we show in a first step that human capital depreciation matters and affects the
income of workers throughout their whole careers. In a second step, we show that the rate
at which the worker’s human capital depreciates is highly heterogeneous according to the
types of tasks workers are charged with. In particular, we identify two classes of tasks
with highly different effects on the workers’ human capital depreciation. On one hand,
we identify the category of knowledge-based tasks—i.e. tasks that are closely related to
certain technologies or the general stock of knowledge available to society. On the other
hand, we identify experience-based tasks as tasks demanding personal characteristics that
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can be improved by more and more experience. Experience-based task are not closely
attached to a certain kind of technology or the general stock of knowledge. We show that
workers mainly performing knowledge-based tasks suffer stronger from human capital
depreciation than workers mainly performing experience-based tasks.
In our first contribution, we confirm previous investigations from other countries by
providing evidence on human capital depreciation for Germany. Our second contribution
introduces the task-based view in the literature on human capital depreciation, by showing
that human capital depreciation is highly heterogenous according to the worker bundles
of tasks.
From the individual’s point of view, the results should affect a worker’s decision to
invest in human capital. Investing purely in high-technology skills at the beginning of an
individual’s career could be a risky strategy for an individual, because there is a danger
of suffering high rates of human capital depreciation. Workers who invest purely in high
technological skills will be outperformed by younger colleagues at later stages of their
career—especially, if workers invests too little in ongoing training. A purely technological
human capital investment might be beneficial in early career stages but could negatively
affect the labor market outcomes (wage losses, unemployment) at later career stages.
From the firm’s perspective, the result provides implications about the age and ex-
perience distributions of firms in different industries. Remaining with high percentages
of younger workers might be an advantageous strategy for firms in technology-intensive
industries, whereas firms in sectors demanding rather experience-based tasks might be
better off by hiring older and more experienced workers. Moreover, even within a firm,
it might be more profitable for younger workers to occupy high-technology jobs and to
have older workers occupy non-technical jobs. Obviously apart from human capital de-
preciation, many other factors influence the optimal age mix of workers within firms.
Therefore, we do not suggest to hire only young workers in technical jobs and old work-
ers in non-technical jobs. We only argue that forms of human capital depreciation should
be considered in hiring and training decisions.
Our suggestions for further research is to find or construct better data sets that are able
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to track informations about individuals task bundles over long time periods. With such
data sets research would be able to measure changes in demands for certain kinds of tasks
and could infer how such changes affect the value of the individuals human capital.
The second part of this dissertation continues investigating the relation between tasks
and income. The aim of this part is to investigate income losses of displaced workers
performing different types of tasks. Therefore, we introduce the task-based view in the
literature on displacement losses. In particular, we investigate displacement losses of
young apprenticeship graduates who undertook their apprenticeship training in different
occupations. Our evidence shows no significant differences in occupational-specific dis-
placement losses. We attribute this finding to the nature of the Danish apprenticeship
system, providing apprentices with up-to-date skills that are easily transferable across oc-
cupations. An additional finding of this chapter is that displacement losses increased sub-
stantially after a nationwide decentralization of the wage bargaining system in Denmark.
Moreover, we can show that displacement losses under a rigid wage bargaining system
appear to be fully attributed to spells of non-employment, whereas under a decentralized
wage bargaining system wage losses remain substantially—even for the continuously em-
ployed.
As a result the contributions of our second part are twofold. First, we contribute
to the literature by showing that young apprenticeship graduates do not differ substan-
tially in their displacement losses. A finding that contradicts other studies that find bigger
displacement losses for manufacturing workers than for service, or commercial workers
(Jacobsen et al.; 1993). Second, we show a strong relation between the flexibility of
wages and displacement losses. This gives new insights of why displacement losses dif-
fer so substantially between Europe and its mostly rigid wage formation process and the
U.S. with its flexible wage bargaining system. Besides investigating occupational-specific
displacement losses for young apprenticeship graduates, further research should aim at in-
vestigating occupational specific displacement losses for other types of workers such as
university graduates or unskilled workers.
The last part of this dissertation investigates whether tasks are linked to gender-
117
Chapter 5: Final Remarks
specific stereotypes and asks whether the tasks-based view can help to explain gender
specific job choices in the labor market. We show that occupational stereotypes can-
not be neglected in labor market research. In particular, we find strong gender-specific
stereotypes for tasks. Consistent with former literature that incorporates the sociologi-
cal concept of identity into classical economic models, we argue that our results indicate
that occupational stereotypes affect individuals utility outcomes. We find that women,
performing stereotypically male tasks, report lower values of satisfaction with their work-
climate and contents of tasks but higher satisfaction with their income. In contrast men,
performing stereotypically male tasks, report higher job satisfaction values for all satis-
faction categories but only if we control for unpleasant working conditions such as night-
shifts and heavy lifting. We argue that these results indicate that individuals trade-off their
utility losses arising from occupational stereotypes with other job characteristics such as
higher income or unpleasant work characteristics. Consequently stereotypes affect the job
choice behavior of individuals.
Therefore, our contribution lies in providing the first empirical investigation that
shows a link between gender-specific stereotypes and job satisfaction. In this way we
contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence that social factors affect util-
ity outcomes of workers and support recent theoretical papers such that of Akerlof and
Kranton (2000). Moreover, we contribute to the literature by providing and supporting a
new explanation for the persistence of gender-specific occupational segregation in western
countries that differs from classical theories of discrimination or gender-specific prefer-
ences (Bender et al.; 2005).
As our results suggest that factors such as prejudices and gender-specific stereotypes
affect the utility outcomes of women and men, classical policy interventions that aim at
reducing discrimination by anti-discrimination laws might fail miserably. Politician might
rather aim at early educational policies and try to change certain social norms. However,
such social influences might be very hard to change and a stable gender job segregation
in Western countries might induce inefficient allocations of workers to jobs and induce
welfare losses for a country’s economy. Therefore, further research should find a way of
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investigating how stereotypes evolve over time and how such stereotypes induce well-fare
losses in the long run.
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